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Magnifying Deterrence by Prosecuting Professionals
SCOTT A. SCHUMACHER*
This Article examines the recent series of criminal prosecutions against tax
professionals and offshore bankers. These criminal cases, brought against the
largest Swiss bank (UBS), the oldest Swiss bank (Wegelin), one of the largest
accounting firms in the world (KPMG), as well as numerous lawyers and
accountants, represent a dramatic shift for the U.S. Department of Justice. After
decades of tolerating abusive tax shelters and tax haven banks, the government
changed its policy. However, rather than indicting the individuals and corporations
who invested in tax shelters or hid money in offshore accounts, the Justice
Department indicted the lawyers, accountants, and bankers who advised them. This
Article will analyze those prosecutions from a theoretical, historical, and practical
perspective, and will examine the impact the new prosecution policy will have on
the legal professional, the tax system, and international relations.
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INTRODUCTION

The past few years have seen a dramatic shift in the prosecution policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice in tax cases. Until recently, the U.S. government rarely
prosecuted cases that involved the gray areas of the law, and arguable, if not
plausible, interpretations of the Tax Code were rarely the subject of prosecutions.1

* Associate Professor of Law, Director Graduate Program in Taxation, University of
Washington School of Law, Seattle. The author would like to thank Professors Steve
Johnson, Kathryn Watts, and Sam Donaldson for their helpful insights, suggestions, and
encouragement, John Clynch, and Rika Valdman for their research assistance and useful
edits, and the library staff of the University of Washington School of Law’s Gallagher Law
Library for their invaluable research assistance.
1. Cf. United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1991).
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Indictments of attorneys and accountants were even rarer, and these prosecutions
usually accompanied the indictment of the taxpayers themselves.2 As a result, the
government generally resorted to bringing civil tax cases when going after
investors in abusive tax shelters, and the professionals who marketed these scams
were rarely brought into even these civil proceedings.3 Likewise, the use of
offshore accounts by U.S. taxpayers was tolerated by prosecutors for decades.4
Indeed, the tax treaty with Switzerland acknowledged Swiss bank secrecy in tax
prosecutions.5 This indulgence of tax shelters and tax havens led, at least in part, to
their proliferation.6
However, beginning with the tax shelter prosecutions in 2005,7 the
government’s policy of restraint has undergone a significant change. Rather than
challenging abusive transactions civilly or prosecuting the taxpayers, the
government began focusing its criminal resources on the professionals who advised
and enabled their clients to evade or avoid taxes. Thus, instead of pursuing
taxpayers who claimed hundreds of millions of dollars in phony losses, the
government decided to go after the accounting firms, law firms, and professionals
who advised these taxpayers.8 And these were not just any firms. The government

2. See, e.g., United States v. Mastropieri, 685 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1982).
3. See, e.g., Gray v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1306, 1323 (1987) (“IME Gold for Tax Dollars”
shelter held to be a fraudulent factual sham; negligence penalties sustained against shelter
investors); Glass v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1087, 1177 (1986) (commodities straddles were
“sham[s] in substance”).
4. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN AID, DEATH AND TAXES: THE TRUE TOLL OF TAX DODGING 20–
21 (2008) [hereinafter CHRISTIAN AID], available at http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images
/deathandtaxes.pdf; 1 WALTER H. DIAMOND & DOROTHY B. DIAMOND, TAX HAVENS OF THE
WORLD, at Intro. 18 (2013).
5. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income, U.S.-Switz., art. 26, Oct. 2, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 112-1 (limiting exchanges of
information in tax investigations to the “prevention of tax fraud or the like”). Under Swiss
law, “tax fraud” is a much more limited concept than under U.S. law, and does not include
tax evasion and most violations of U.S. tax laws. Rolf H. Weber, Swiss Banking Secrecy in
Evolution, 18 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 317, 337 (2003).
6. See infra notes 114–58 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. N.Y., to Robert S.
Bennett 2 (Aug. 26, 2005) [hereinafter KPMG DPA] (transmitting the KPMG Deferred
Prosecution Agreement), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05
/kpmgdpagmt.pdf. It may be argued that a deferred prosecution agreement is not really a
“prosecution.” See, e.g., Editorial, Too Big to Indict?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A38,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/hsbc-too-big-to-indict.html?_r=0.
In many respects, a deferred prosecution agreement has all the hallmarks of a criminal
prosecution, at least with respect to entities that cannot be jailed. KPMG, HSBC, and others
entering into a deferred prosecution agreement have publicly admitted to conduct that
violated the law, and they paid large monetary sanctions. Yet, these entities did not plead
guilty to a crime. Thus, to the extent that a criminal conviction still carries a stigma, these
entities have not been subject to the full force of the criminal law. I will reserve a full
discussion on the question of whether a deferred prosecution is truly a criminal prosecution.
For purposes of this Article, I will assume that it is.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Daugerdas, 757 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); United
States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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proceeded criminally against professionals from some of the leading law and
accounting firms, including KPMG, Ernst & Young, Brown & Wood, and Jenkens
& Gilchrist.9 These cases garnered mixed results for the government, with the
government getting some notable victories,10 but also some high-profile losses.11 In
the process, however, the government effectively shut down the tax shelter industry
and fundamentally changed tax practice.12
The government persisted in this policy of pursuing professionals when it
decided to go after Swiss banks and bankers, instead of the tens of thousands of
U.S. depositors who hid money in undeclared offshore accounts. As with the tax
shelter cases, the government targeted some of the biggest players, entering into a
Deferred Prosecution Agreement with UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank, and
indicting some of its bankers.13 In 2012, the government indicted Switzerland’s
oldest bank, Wegelin Bank, and three of its partners, even though the bank had no
U.S. office.14 As a result of the indictment, the bank essentially ceased to exist as
an independent entity within a month.15 Wegelin pleaded guilty to tax crimes in
January 2013, and formally ceased operation.16 While the prosecution of banks and

9. See, e.g., United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2012); Daugerdas, 757 F.
Supp. 2d 364; Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330.
10. See, e.g., Christie Smythe & Bob Van Voris, Former Lawyer Daugerdas Convicted
in Tax-Fraud Scheme Retrial, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-31/ex-lawyer-daugerdas-convicted-in-taxfraud-scheme-retrial-1.
11. See, e.g., Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330. The Stein loss was the result of prosecutorial
overreaching and not the underlying substance of accusations in the indictment. See United
States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 157 (2d Cir. 2008). Indeed, three of the codefendants in Stein
were convicted. See Lynnley Browning, 3 Convicted in KPMG Tax Shelter Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at B11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/business
/18kpmg.html.
12. Tax practice was also affected by changes in the ethical rules applicable to rendering
tax advice. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2011).
13. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, U.S. Indicts Two in Switzerland on Tax Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, at B1; Lynnley Browning, A Swiss Bank Is Set to Open Its Secret
Files, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19
/business/worldbusiness/19ubs.html; see also Indictment, United States v. Little, No 1:12mj-01241 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2012) (British attorney indicted for assisting U.S. taxpayers to
hide funds in Swiss and other foreign bank accounts); David Voreacos, Offshore Tax
Scorecard: UBS, Credit Suisse, HSBC, Julius Baer, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 12,
2011),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-12/offshore-tax-scorecard-ubs-credit
-suisse-hsbc-julius-baer.html.
14. David Voreacos, Swiss Bank Wegelin Charged in U.S. with Aiding Tax Evasion,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-03
/swiss-bank-wegelin-charged-in-u-dot-s-dot-with-aiding-tax-evasion; Christoph Eisenring,
Die Checkliste der US-Justiz, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.nzz.ch
/aktuell/wirtschaft/uebersicht/die-checkliste-der-us-justiz-1.14406167.
15. Haig Simonian, Wegelin Becomes Victim of US Tax Dispute, FIN. TIMES (Jan 27,
2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/864c58ca-48fc-11e1-88f0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz
21ZLScv2B.
16. Rupert Neate, Oldest Swiss Bank to Close After US Tax Evasion Scam, GUARDIAN,
Jan. 5, 2013, at 32, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/04/swiss-bank
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bankers was ongoing, the government allowed most U.S. taxpayers to resolve their
cases civilly via a series of offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives.17 These
combined actions, along with the actions of other countries, dramatically changed
offshore banking and the use and perception of tax havens.18
In this Article, I will examine the government’s decision to pursue the
professionals, instead of the clients the professionals represented, and the impact
this revised prosecution policy has had on the tax system.19 In so doing, I will
examine these prosecutions in their historical context, analyze whether they
represent sound policy, and recommend whether changes in the policy should be
made.
In Part I of the Article, I will examine the history of criminal prosecutions in
both the tax shelter and tax haven areas. This history demonstrates that very few
people, whether taxpayer or professional, were charged criminally for investing in
tax shelters or hiding money in tax havens. This tolerance by prosecutors led to
their continued use and expansion. Part II will then discuss the recent criminal
prosecutions brought against tax lawyers, accountants, and bankers for their role in
assisting their clients and customers in evading taxes. These cases will provide the
necessary backdrop for what appears to be a fundamental shift in prosecution
policy.
Part III of the Article will analyze the theory underlying criminal prosecutions.
In this Part, I will show that federal prosecutors enjoy wide discretion as to whom
to charge. Given this discretion, it is essential that front-line prosecutors are guided
by clear prosecution policies and that those policies be consistently followed. These
policies, while not crystalline, require prosecutors to determine the culpability of
the person charged, including the person’s relative culpability in relation to other
actors not charged; the deterrent effect (particularly general deterrence) that would
result from the prosecution; the retributive effect of the prosecution, in particular
whether the victim of the crime has been compensated and their injuries have been
addressed; and whether the prosecution will serve to protect the integrity of the
civil tax system.
Finally, in Part IV, I will examine whether the recent prosecutions are consistent
with the criminal theory and the government’s prosecution goals discussed in Part
III. I will argue that both the tax shelter and tax haven cases were generally
consistent with criminal theory and the goals of prosecution policies and have for
the most part been very successful. The most successful, indeed ingenious, aspect
of the policy, whether intended or not, comes from the leveraging of general
deterrence. By prosecuting professionals, rather than the taxpayers, the government
has magnified the deterrent effect of the prosecutions. In so doing, the revised
prosecution policies have fundamentally changed tax compliance.
-wegelin-close-tax-evasion.
17. See, e.g., IRS Notice 2011-54, 2011-29 I.R.B. 53; IRS Notice 2010-23, 2010-11
I.R.B. 441.
18. Thomas Zehnle & George Clarke, When the Wall Comes Crumbling Down: What to
Do with Taxpayers Who Cannot or Will Not Voluntarily Disclose, 7 WHITE COLLAR CRIME
REP. (BNA), Jan. 13, 2013, at 33.
19. It should be noted that the government’s decision to go after professionals is not
limited to tax prosecutions. See, e.g., Scott A. Schumacher, Stevens: Is Zealous Advocacy
Obstruction of Justice?, 132 TAX NOTES 1169 (2011).
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That being said, the new prosecution policy is not beyond criticism. The tax
professionals who marketed the tax shelters created and sold these shelters to their
clients as a prepackaged transaction at a handsome profit. Thus, without the
professionals, no taxpayer would have invested in these shelters, and they have at
least a colorable claim of relying on their professional advisor. By contrast, the tax
haven banks are no more culpable (and arguably less culpable) than many of the
U.S. taxpayers who hid money in those accounts, and who escaped prosecution.
More significantly, while the tax haven prosecutions address the losses suffered by
U.S. taxpayers, little has been done for the true victims of tax haven abuse—the
developing world. I will provide a brief review of the devastating impact of tax
havens on the developing world. Thus, while prosecuting bankers may make sense
from a pragmatic standpoint, more must be done to protect the integrity of the tax
system and to ensure that the injuries of the true victims of this conduct are
redressed.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TAX PROSECUTIONS
A. Tax Shelters
The concept of minimizing one’s taxes has existed for centuries, and tax shelters
are nothing new.20 Indeed, the 1970s saw a proliferation of shelters, which were
invested in by thousands of taxpayers.21 These shelters were generally dealt with in
civil cases and were ultimately shut down by legislative changes.22 Significantly,
many of these shelters involved mostly, if not completely, fictitious transactions.23
Taxpayers “invested” in mines with no ore,24 cattle that did not roam,25 and
videotapes that did not play.26 In the words of Gertrude Stein, “there is no there
there.”27 And the losses in these cases were not insignificant. Indeed, the estimated
current revenue loss from these shelters was not appreciably less than the more
recent generations of shelters.28 However, despite the utterly fictitious nature of

20. See, e.g., Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive Transactions: Why
Today’s Thoughtful U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to “Just Say No,” in 3 MPI
Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law 289, 289 (2008) (recounting tax
dodges throughout history since the times of Ancient Rome).
21. See, e.g., Glass v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986) (consolidating more than 1000 cases).
22. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 465, 469 (2012).
23. See, e.g., Goldberg v. United States, 789 F.2d 1341, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1986)
(describing “Margolis transactions” typical of shelters peddled by Harry Margolis, which
were characterized by convoluted transfers of overvalued property rights, circular money
movements among foreign trusts, delayed drafting, signing and backdating of documents,
and client obliviousness to the financial realities of their investments).
24. Bouskos v. Comm’r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117 (1987).
25. Durham Farms # 1, J.V. v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2009, aff’d, 59 F. App’x 952
(9th Cir. 2003).
26. Magin v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 208 (1985).
27. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (photo. reprint 1971) (1937).
28. The IRS estimates a revenue loss of $3.6 billion in 1983. Ann Southworth,
Redefining the Attorney’s Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REV. 889, 889 n.4
(1985) (citing Randall Smith & Kenneth H. Bacon, Building Trouble?: Boom in Tax Shelters
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these transactions, very few people were prosecuted. One of the few people to be
indicted was Harry Margolis, perhaps the most infamous tax lawyer who marketed
tax shelters in the 1970s.29 The government brought two separate prosecutions
against Margolis and failed to obtain a conviction in either case. This would
understandably have made the government a little gun-shy in prosecuting future
cases. The government also lost other high profile criminal tax cases that involved
arguable questions of law.30
The result was that cases where a plausible argument could be made were
essentially immune from prosecution.31 This system, along with the government’s
general tolerance of tax shelters (at least from a criminal perspective),32 led to a
belief that even the hokiest of schemes would not be prosecuted, as long as it had at
least a patina of legitimacy.33 Moreover, the thicker the patina the better.
Disguising what essentially was a made-up series of predetermined transactions in
a blizzard of paperwork made the transaction at least appear to be legitimate. It also
had the perverse effect of making these shelters more difficult to detect.34 Not only
did these transactions greatly benefit the clients, they were also incredibly lucrative
for the firms who promoted them.35
Moreover, shelters thrived under a system that imposed little downside to either
the client or the professional advising the client. Taxpayers are not subject to
penalties if they can show they acted with reasonable cause in good faith.36
Reliance on the advice of a professional generally constitutes reasonable cause and
good faith.37 If a lawyer or accountant advises a taxpayer that a position has a
more-likely-than-not chance of success, then, at least as to that taxpayer and that
tax position, the position does meet that standard, since taxpayers are generally
38
allowed to rely on the advice of tax experts. Thus, the low audit rate, complex and
Artificially Lifts Prices of Much Real Estate, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 1). In 2007
dollars, that amount is $7.6 billion. The IRS estimated $10 billion in losses from the recent
iteration of shelters. Mary Williams Walsh, Treasury Department Cracks Down on Tax
Shelters for Firms, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at C-1.
29. See Goldberg, 789 F.2d 1341.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1131 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that
criminal prosecutions “must rest on a violation of a clear rule of law”); United States v.
Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1985) (overturning a conviction that was based on a vague
point of law).
31. Cf. Harris, 942 F.2d. at 1134–35 (discussing evidence presented at trial that may
have supported convictions for various other crimes that were never charged).
32. These shelters were certainly not tolerated altogether. The IRS and Department of
Justice engaged in a vigorous civil campaign against these shelters. See, e.g., Glass v.
Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986).
33. Indeed, it was believed that these schemes would not be subject even to civil
penalties. Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 93–94 (2006).
34. Scott A. Schumacher, MacNiven v. Westmoreland and Tax Advice: Using
“Purposive Textualism” to Deal with Tax Shelters and Promote Legitimate Tax Advice, 92
MARQ. L. REV. 33, 90 (2008).
35. See Rostain, supra note 33, at 93–94.
36. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4 (2012).
37. Id.
38. See Schumacher, supra note 34, at 62.
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nearly impenetrable transactions, and high-net-worth individuals willing to take a
chance on these transactions created a dangerous cocktail indeed.
B. Tax Havens
Tax havens,39 or global financial centers, as they are sometimes called, have
existed since at least the 1930s.40 Modern tax havens have their origins in
Switzerland and that country’s bank secrecy laws.41 Privacy in banking and
financial matters is part of Switzerland’s historic tradition of protecting all secrets
and a general commitment to the preservation and protection of the individual’s
right of privacy.42 Swiss bank secrecy laws date from the 1930s and were designed,
at least initially, to protect individuals, particularly those in Nazi Germany, from
having their accounts seized.43 When the Swiss Banking Act was enacted in 1934,
foreign nations, and not just Nazi Germany, were attempting to confiscate Jewish
property. Agents were sent into Switzerland to find bank accounts of Jews and
other dissidents. Thus, Swiss banking secrecy laws must be understood in their
historical context.
Bank secrecy is enshrined in Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act44 and Article
273 of the Swiss Penal Code.45 Under these laws, Swiss bankers must protect their
customer’s name, the type of bank account, the transactions the client entered into,
and any information supplied by the customer in connection with the account.46
Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code makes it a crime for a person to divulge secret
business information to a foreign government authority or its agents.47 In addition
to criminal sanctions, violating confidentiality mandates could also result in civil
liability and administrative sanctions, including revocation of a bank’s license or
suspension of a bank executive convicted of a secrecy violation.48 The availability
of private and secure banking caused many of the world’s wealthy to put their
money in Swiss banks. This influx of capital was a boon to Switzerland’s economy.

39. There is no one accepted definition of what constitutes a tax haven, nor is there an
agreed upon list of the countries that should be considered tax havens. See, e.g., U. S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-157, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: LARGE U.S.
CORPORATIONS AND FEDERAL CONTRACTORS WITH SUBSIDIARIES IN JURISDICTIONS LISTED AS
TAX HAVENS OR FINANCIAL PRIVACY JURISDICTIONS 9–17 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
40. See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and International
Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 325, 328 (1998).
41. Id. at 328–30.
42. Id.
43. Lutz Krauskopf, Regents’ Lectures: Comments on Switzerland’s Insider Trading,
Money Laundering, and Banking Secrecy Laws, 9 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 277, 293 (1991).
44. Bundesgesetz [BankG] [Banking Statute] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952.0, art. 47 (Switz.)
[hereinafter Banking Statute], unofficial translation available at http://www.kpmg.com/CH
/de/Library/Legislative-Texts/Documents/pub_20090101-BankA.pdf.
45. SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, art.
273 (Switz.) [hereinafter SWISS PENAL CODE], reprinted in Krauskopf, supra note 43, at 295.
46. Banking Statute art. 47(a).
47. SWISS PENAL CODE, supra note 45, at art. 273.
48. See Krauskopf, supra note 43, at 296–97.The conduct of UBS and its bankers must
be viewed in light of this very stringent requirement.
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The success of the Swiss banking industry caused other countries around the
world to look at banking and financial services as a possible industry.
Liechtenstein, for example, saw its neighbor and close ally as a big brother to be
emulated. By enacting a combination of strict bank secrecy laws, flexible and
nuanced entity structures, and low taxes, Liechtenstein transformed itself from a
poor agricultural country into a prosperous, highly industrialized economy with a
thriving financial service industry.49 The United Kingdom also saw the benefit of
low taxes and bank secrecy in attracting capital, which it desperately needed in the
decades following World War II. It used its Crown Dependencies, like the Cayman
Islands, British Virgin Islands, and Bermuda to attract this capital.50 It is no
accident that many tax havens are current or former British colonies or
dependencies.51 In the following decades, tax havens sprang up around the world,
from Panama to Iceland, Singapore to Monaco—all offering financial security and
privacy.
While the label of tax haven is often considered something to be avoided,
especially recently,52 countries who offered these services usually attained greater
financial success. The per capita GDP of haven countries greatly exceeds those of
nonhaven countries.53 Liechtenstein has the second highest per capita income in the
world, after Monaco (another tax haven).54 The Cayman Islands, which prior to its
status as a tax haven was poor with few natural resources, now has one of the
highest standards of living in the Caribbean.55 The benefits of being a tax haven
must be fully appreciated if serious reforms are to take place. Wealthy nations rich

49. 2 DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 4, at Liech. 4.
50. The UK Crown Dependencies continue to make a significant contribution to the UK
financial markets and the British banking system. MICHAEL FOOT, FINAL REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BRITISH OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES 6 (2009), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/foot_review
_main.pdf.
51. See Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and Opportunities Are Created by Tax
Havens?, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 661, 671 n.24 (2008); Richard A. Johnson, Why
Harmful Tax Practices Will Continue After Developing Nations Pay: A Critique of the OECD’s
Initiatives Against Harmful Tax Competition, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 351, 359 (2006).
52. See Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty
Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 678 (2012). Being labeled a “tax haven” can earn a country
a spot on the OECD’s “black list,” with the concomitant threat of sanctions. See, e.g., Martin
A. Sullivan, Lessons From the Last War on Tax Havens, TAX NOTES, Jul. 30, 2007, at 327.
In addition, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) imposes a strict
withholding regime on distributions from the U.S. to foreign financial institutions that have
not entered into a tax reporting agreement with the Internal Revenue Service. FATCA, Pub.
L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71, 97 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474).
53. Dharmapala, supra note 51, at 664.
54. Leigh Baldwin & Carolyn Bandel, Liechtenstein Monarch Will Keep Veto Powers
After Referendum, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 1, 2012, 8:06 AM), http://www
.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-01/liechtenstein-monarch-will-keep-veto-powers-afterreferendum. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 13–14 (showing both Liechtenstein
and Monaco as jurisdictions identified as tax havens).
55. 1 DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 4, at Cayman Is. 3.
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in natural resources cannot seriously believe that small countries with no natural
resources would willingly give up their primary source of revenue.56
More recently, other countries have seen the benefits of providing financial
services to the world’s wealthy. The Netherlands have gained international
notoriety for trusts holding the wealth of rock stars like the Rolling Stones and U2,
so that these and other multimillionaires do not have to pay U.K. taxes on their
royalties.57 The combination of treaties and tax laws of Ireland and the Netherlands
has caused many international corporations to structure their transactions in what
has become known as the rather yummy-sounding name of the “Double Irish with a
Dutch Sandwich.”58 Denmark has become the country of choice to set up a
corporation that owns other corporations, thereby facilitating tax avoidance.59 Even
the Vatican’s bank, the Institute for Works of Religion (Istituto per le Opere di
Religione in Italian), holds billions of dollars of deposits all with strict bank
secrecy.60 Finally, depending upon how one defines the term “tax haven,” several
U.S. states, including Nevada, Wyoming, and Delaware, have been labeled tax
havens.61
Of course, there has not been a universal acceptance of tax havens. Concerns
about money laundering and terrorism financing triggered many jurisdictions to
require banks to “know [their] customer[s]” in an effort to stop the illicit flow of
money.62 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
maintains a “black list” and a “gray list” that purport to show the level of
cooperation by tax haven countries.63 Various governments have set up task forces
to deal with the problems of tax havens.64 However, no one could be so naïve as to

56. See generally Dharmapala, supra note 51, at 663–64.
57. Lynnley Browning, Gimme Tax Shelter: The Stars Have Found a Dutch Home, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/business
/yourmoney/04amster.html?pagewanted=all.
58. See, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 717, 778 (2012).
59. See, e.g., Marcus Hoy, Denmark Facing New Criticism as Tax Evasion ‘Transit
Station,’ 9 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Aug. 13, 2009, at I-1.
60. 1 DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 4, at Intro. 16.
61. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, Critics Call Delaware a Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES, May
30, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/business/30delaware.html;
Finance and Economics: Haven Hypocrisy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 2009, at 86, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/13382279.
62. See, e.g., Maira Machado, Similar in Their Differences: Transnational Legal
Processes Addressing Money Laundering in Brazil and Argentina, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
330, 356 (2012).
63. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., TAX CO-OPERATION: TOWARDS
LEVEL
P LAYING
FIELD
(2007),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/tax
A
/transparency/44430309.pdf.
64. One example of this is the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre (JITSIC),
which is a joint effort by the tax agencies of Australia, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. JOINT INT'L TAX SHELTER INFO. CTR., MEMORANDUM
OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE CREATION OF A JOINT INTERNATIONAL TAX SHELTER INFORMATION
CENTRE, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/jitsic-finalmou.pdf.
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think that the wealthy were not still hiding money offshore. Everyone knew it, but
they lacked the will, the ability, or the interest to stop it.
Indeed, as with tax shelters, the government brought few criminal tax
prosecutions for the use of tax havens,65 and even those few prosecutions did not
always result in conviction.66 Prosecutors did not pursue the offshore banks
themselves. Instead, they sought merely to obtain information from the banks about
U.S. depositors,67 and even those efforts produced a backlash.68
II. A SEA CHANGE
A. The Tax Shelter War
With a new century, the government’s treatment of both tax shelters and tax
havens began to change. On a broader scale, the Justice Department beefed up its
“Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” in January 2003 by
then-Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, in what is known as the
Thompson Memorandum.69 This amplified policy showed that the government
would take a harder line against corporate crime.70 The government backed up this
tough talk with its indictment of Arthur Andersen.71 This “get tough” approach was
also employed in tax cases, with the government going after tax shelters in both
civil and criminal cases.72

65. But see United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1992) (defendant convicted of
tax evasion for hiding assets in Swiss nominee account).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1983) (law of foreign
trusts unsettled and conviction thus overturned).
67. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th
Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 832.
69. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys,
Regarding Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.albany.edu/acc/courses/acc695spring2008/thompson%20memo.pdf.
70. Id. Several aspects of the Thompson Memorandum came under attack in the highprofile prosecution of several former partners of the accounting firm KPMG. Most notably,
the government used the threat of indictment and prosecution, which in Arthur Andersen’s
case was in essence a death sentence, to pressure KPMG into waiving its attorney-client
privilege and cutting off payment of legal fees for individual partners of KPMG that had
been indicted. See United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2006),
vacated sub nom., Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007). In response to the
criticism, the Thompson Memorandum was revised in 2006 by then-Deputy Attorney
General Paul McNulty. This revision has softened some of the more draconian aspects of the
Thompson Memorandum. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to
U.S. Attorneys, on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 6,
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
71. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
72. In August 2003, Eileen O’Connor, the then-Assistant Attorney General of the Tax
Division, set out the actions taken by the government to combat abusive tax shelters: (1)
investigated ninety-nine tax shelter promoters, including law firms, accounting firms, and
banks; (2) issued 272 summonses to thirty-five promoters regarding with tax shelter
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In Notice 2000-44, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) stated that certain
shelters were considered abusive,73 and that investors in these shelters might be
subject to criminal prosecution.74 Although similar to the generations of shelters,
the breed of tax shelters listed in Notice 2000-44 and other IRS notices differed in
size and scope from shelters from the 1970s. While the typical 1970s shelter
involved tax savings in the thousands of dollars, the new shelters saved the
taxpayers millions of dollars.75 However, like the shelters of old, the newer shelters
involved taking the tax code provision out of context and inventing facts.
One of the most notorious—and lucrative—of these shelters was the Son of
BOSS shelter.76 While known by many names77 and with different variations, these
shelters had essentially the same fundamentals. The taxpayer would enter into a
short-sale transaction, which had the corresponding obligation to close the
transaction at later date. The initial short sale would produce a large amount of
cash, which, along with other cash or property, was transferred into a partnership.78
The taxpayer would increase their basis in the partnership by the value of the cash
and other property contributed, but the taxpayer would not reduce his basis by the
obligation to close the short sale, citing a strained reading of § 752.79 The
partnership would then close the short sale, thereby reducing the amount of cash in
the partnership. Shortly thereafter, the taxpayer would sell his interest in the
partnership for a price equal to the cash and property remaining in the partnership.
This transaction would generate a loss equal to the difference between the amount
realized over the adjusted basis unreduced by the obligation, generating losses in
some cases in excess of $100 million.80
These shelters had no business purpose and were entered into solely to generate
tax losses. Like the “Margolis transactions,” these transactions were prewired and
registration and investor list requirements; (3) obtained investor lists from at least twentyfive promoters; (4) identified twenty-seven abusive tax shelters through formal notices; and
(5) audited taxpayers to determine whether they invested in abusive transactions. IRS Sues to
Enforce Promoter Summonses, Get Investor Names from Jenkens & Gilchrist, 22 TAX
MGMT. WEEKLY. REPORT (BNA), Aug. 18, 2003, at 1326.
73. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255.
74. Id. at 256; see also I.R.S. Notice 2000-61, 2000-2 C.B. 569; I.R.S. Notice 2002-50,
2002-2 C.B. 98.
75. For example, several KPMG clients claimed fraudulent losses in excess of $100
million. See Superseding Indictment at 64–66, United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), No. S1 05 Cr. 888 (LAK), available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages
/pdf/business/20051018_kpmgletter.pdf.
76. The Son of BOSS tax shelter is a derivation of the BOSS (Bond Option and Sales
Strategy). Kligfeld Holdings v. Comm’r, 128 T.C. 192, 194 (2007).
77. These shelters were known by other proprietary names like COBRA, BLIPS and
SOS. Leandra Lederman, A Tisket, a Tasket: Basketing and Corporate Tax Shelters, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 557, 590 n.222 (2011) (citing Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch,
COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax Shelter, 62 TAX LAW 59, 62, 64 n.20 (2008)).
78. Kligfeld Holdings, 128 T.C. at 194–95.
79. Id. at 195–96; see also 26 U.S.C. § 752(b) (“Any decrease in a partner’s share of the
liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner’s individual liabilities by reason of
the assumption by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as a
distribution of money to the partner by the partnership.”).
80. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, supra note 73; Superseding Indictment, supra note 75, at 64–66.
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predetermined.81 The promoters drafted all of the documents and executed all of the
transactions.82 They created false factual recitations setting forth the taxpayer’s
alleged business purpose in entering into the transactions and presented them to the
client for signature.83 This false factual recitation then became the factual basis for
the opinion letter drafted by the promoter.84 An associate (or co-conspirator, if you
will) would then prepare a tax return based on the phony opinion letter drafted by
the promoter, which was based on the bogus statement of facts, also drafted by the
promoter.85
While the prior tax shelter industry involved professionals who were mostly
outliers,86 the advisors involved in the more recent shelters worked for some of the
most prestigious accounting and law firms.87 The fees earned by these professionals
were equally impressive. KPMG earned $53 million from just one tax shelter it
sold to 186 individuals.88 BDO Seidman, through its tax products group known as
the “wolf pack,” admitted to receiving $100 million from its tax shelter sales.89
Banks like Deutsche Bank, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch also got into the act,90
as did law firms like Jenkens & Gilchrist and Brown & Wood.91 Jenkens &
Gilchrist attorney Paul Daugerdas made more than $95 million from marketing
shelters from 1998 through 2002.92
Faced with incredible tax losses, the egregious nature of the transactions,
combined with a determination to do something about tax shelters, the government
abandoned its long-standing tolerance of shelters. In 2005, the international accounting
firm KPMG escaped indictment only by entering into a deferred prosecution

81. See Goldberg v. United States, 789 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1986).
82. See, e.g., KPMG DPA, supra note 7.
83. Id. ¶ 2.
84. Id.
85. Superseding Indictment, supra note 75, at 9–10.
86. See, e.g., Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners: Transcript of Tax Law Review’s
1952 Banquet, 8 TAX L. REV. 1, 24 (1952) (comments of J.P. Wenchel) (“It is the blackleg—
and he was always in the profession. What are you going to do about him? He is on the
fringe of society.”).
87. Rostain, supra note 33, at 90–91.
88. Tanina Rostain, Travails in Tax: KPMG and the Tax Shelter Controversy, in LEGAL
ETHICS: LAW STORIES 89, 101 (Deborah L. Rhode & David J. Luban eds., 2005).
89. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Unhappy Returns: Accounting Firms Face Backlash over
the Tax Shelters They Sold, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2003, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1044568358985594893.html.
90. ACM v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); Nathan Vardi, Deutsche Bank Will
Pay $554 Million for Illegal Tax Shelter Activity, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2010, 2:11 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2010/12/21/deutsche-bank-will-pay-554-million
-for-illegal-tax-shelter-activity/.
91. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, 108th Cong., U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS,
AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS (2003); Jenkens & Gilchrist Admits It Is Subject to $76 Million
IRS Penalty, I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-71 (Mar. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Jenkens-&-Gilchrist-Admits-It-Is-Subject-to-$76-Million-IRS-Penalty.
92. Lynnley Browning, 7 Indicted on Charges of Selling Tax Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/business/10tax.html?_r=1&.
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agreement and agreeing to pay a $456 million fine. In so doing, it admitted that from
1996 through 2002, it assisted high-net-worth individuals evade income taxes on
billions of dollars of income by developing, promoting, and implementing fraudulent
tax shelters.94 KPMG also admitted that a number of its partners engaged in unlawful
and fraudulent conduct, including preparing false tax returns, drafting false factual
recitations and representations as part of the documentation supporting the shelters,
and issuing opinions that contained these false statements and concealed the true
nature of the shelters from the IRS.95 KPMG also agreed to shut down its individual,
compensation, and benefits tax practices, and employ heightened opinion standards
when rendering tax opinions.96 Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest bank, agreed to pay
a fine of $554 million for its role in helping KPMG implement these tax shelters.97
In 2007, Jenkens & Gilchrist, a Dallas-based law firm, whose Chicago office was
one of the hotbeds of tax shelter promotion, entered into a non-prosecution agreement.
Under this agreement, Jenkens agreed to pay a $76 million penalty and to shut down
its practice. The firm no longer exists.98 In 2012, the accounting firm of BDO Seidman
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in which it agreed to pay a $50 million
fine for helping its clients evade more than $1.3 billion in taxes on more than $6.5
billion in income.99
The professionals who worked at these firms were not so fortunate. Nineteen
individuals, most of whom worked for KPMG, were indicted and charged with
conspiracy, tax evasion, and obstructing the IRS.100 In 2007, four former partners of
the accounting firm Ernst & Young were charged with tax fraud, conspiracy, and
related crimes arising out of tax shelters promoted by Ernst & Young.101 Paul
Daugerdas, the lead tax shelter promoter at Jenkens & Gilchrist, along with six others,
was indicted and charged with conspiracy, tax evasion, and obstructing the IRS.102
Many other professionals have been indicted for their roles in promoting abusive tax
shelters. In each instance, these tax professionals were charged with creating
transactions that had no business purpose, lacked economic substance, and were
papered with false recitations by clients, with the factual recitations having been
drafted by the professionals themselves.

93. KPMG DPA, supra note 7, ¶ 3.
94. Id. ¶ 2.
95. Id.
96. Id. ¶ 6.
97. Vardi, supra note 90.
98. Chad Bray, Tax-Shelter Case Brings Convictions, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2011, at C3,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304066504576343882600
125752.html.
99. Janet Novack, BDO Admits Generating $6.5 Billion in Phony Tax Shelter Losses,
Pays $50 Million, FORBES (June 13, 2012, 7:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/janetnovack/2012/06/13/bdo-admits-generating-6-5-billion-in-phony-tax-shelter-losses-pays
-50-million/.
100. Superseding Indictment, supra note 75.
101. Press Release, Yusill Scribner, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. N.Y., Four Individuals
Charged in Criminal Tax Fraud Related to Ernst & Young Tax Shelters (May 30, 2007),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May07/eyindictmentpr.pdf.
102. See United States v. Daugerdas, 757 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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Significantly, while the clients of these professionals were often listed as coconspirators, very few of the clients were actually indicted. Instead, the IRS offered a
global settlement to investors in these shelters that allowed taxpayers to resolve their
cases by paying civil penalties.103
This new prosecution policy has helped to transform tax practice. Of course,
criminal sanctions were not the only arrow in the government’s quiver. New penalties
applicable to tax shelter investors and their advisors were enacted,104 the IRS adopted
new rules for giving written tax advice,105 and the government won some key victories
in civil tax cases against shelters.106 However, the importance of the criminal
prosecutions and shock of seeing the names of prominent professionals after “United
States v.” in the header of an indictment should not be underestimated. The result of
these policies was succinctly stated by former Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax
Policy, Pamela Olson: “The tax shelter war is over. The government won.”107
B. The Swiss and Liechtenstein Tax Haven Cases
The U.S. government’s apparent tolerance of tax havens ended in 2008 when two
spectacular cases, replete with international espionage, intrigue, and skullduggery,
brought tax havens into the consciousness of governments, policy makers, and the
media. Like the tax shelter cases, the egregious nature of these tax haven cases
changed the government’s policy from one of passive acceptance to active criminal
investigation and prosecution.
1. Liechtenstein and LGT
Liechtenstein is an ancient country whose predecessor was founded in 1342.108 The
Principality of Liechtenstein was established within the Holy Roman Empire in 1719,
and it became a sovereign state in 1806. Until the end of World War II, Liechtenstein
was mainly agricultural and poor. Since then, this tiny country with limited natural
resources has developed into a prosperous, highly industrialized, free-enterprise
economy with a vital financial service sector and the highest per capita income in the
world.109 Until very recently, Liechtenstein also had strict bank secrecy laws,110 which
caused it to be described as “the most dangerous tax haven in Europe.”111

103. See, e.g., I.R.S. Announcement 2004-46, 2004-21 I.R.B. 964; I.R.S. Announcement
2005-80, 2005-46 I.R.B. 967.
104. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6700, 6707A (2012).
105. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2011).
106. See, e.g., Kornman & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2008);
ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1998).
107. Victor Fleischer, “The Tax Shelter War Is Over,” CONGLOMERATE (Oct. 28, 2006),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/10/the_tax_shelter.html.
108. About Liechtenstein, LIECHTENSTEIN: EMBASSY OF LIECHTENSTEIN—WASHINGTON
D.C., http://www.liechtensteinusa.org/index.php?page=history.
109. Id.
110. See 2 DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 4, at Liech. 3.
111. Id. at Liech. 1.
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LGT Group, formerly the Liechtenstein Global Trust, is a large private wealth
and asset management group owned by the royal family of Liechtenstein. The LGT
Group is wholly owned by the Prince of Liechtenstein Foundation.112 The Prince of
Liechtenstein Foundation, in turn, is owned by the Royal Family, with Prince HansAdam II as the principal beneficiary.113 The prince enjoys an estimated net worth of
$5 billion.114 His brother, Prince Philipp von und zu Liechtenstein, is chairman of
the Board of Trustees of the Foundation, and his son, Prince Max von und zu
Liechtenstein, serves as CEO.115
The status of Liechtenstein as a leading tax haven changed on February 14,
2008, when prosecutors and tax investigators carried out simultaneous raids on the
headquarters of Deutsche Post, Europe’s biggest postal service, and the private villa
of its CEO Klaus Zumwinkel. Zumwinkel was arrested on national television. He
was accused of having evaded approximately $1.5 million in taxes using a
foundation in Liechtenstein and secreting money in LGT.116 According to an article
in the German periodical Der Spiegel: “The investigation has taken on a dimension
previously unknown in Germany. It was the first time in history that the CEO of a
German blue chip DAX company had been taken from his home by authorities in
front of live news cameras.”117 Zumwinkel was the CEO of Deutsche Post, and at
the time of his arrest was one of Germany's most influential businessmen,118 sitting
on the boards of Postbank and Deutsche Telekom.119
The extraordinary investigation and arrest of Zumwinkel was the result of
information received by German investigators. Tax investigators of the German
government paid a former employee of LGT, Heinrich Kieber, as much as $7.7
million for bank account data that Kieber had stolen from LGT Group.120 The
computer discs Germany obtained from Kieber contained about 1400 names, the

112. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 110th Cong., TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX
COMPLIANCE 32–33 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
113. Id. at 33 & n.103.
114. See Luisa Kroll, Europe’s Richest Royals, Forbes (Apr. 27, 2011, 11:44 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/luisakroll/2011/04/27/europes-richest-royals/.
115. SENATE REPORT, supra note 112, at 33 n.103.
116. Barbara Schmid, Raid on Zumwinkel’s Home and Office: Authorities Investigating
Deutsche Post CEO for Tax Evasion, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Feb. 14, 2008, 10:41 AM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/raid-on-zumwinkel-s-home-and-office
-authorities-investigating-deutsche-post-ceo-for-tax-evasion-a-535230.html. A foundation or
“stiftung” is a creature of statute under Liechtenstein law and has features that are similar to
a trust. M. Read Moore, Tax and Estate Planning Issues for U.S. Clients Who Own Foreign
Property, in TAX AND ESTATE PLANNING ISSUES FOR U.S. CLIENTS WHO OWN FOREIGN
PROPERTY 2289, 2297 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Nov. 16–20, 2009), available at
Westlaw SR016 ALI-ABA 2289.
117. Schmid, supra note 116.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Alan Katz & Joshua Gallu, Checkered Past for Fugitive at Center of Liechtenstein
Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/18/business
/worldbusiness/18iht-evade.4.13802720.html?pagewanted=all.
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release of which set off investigations in fourteen countries, including the United
States.121
2. The Other Tax Haven Scandal – UBS
At the same time as the LGT case was unfolding, the activities of Swiss banking
giant UBS came to light. UBS, formerly Union Bank of Switzerland,122 is “one of
the largest financial institutions in the world, and has one of the largest private
banks catering to wealthy individuals.”123 As with the LGT case, the UBS case
broke because of the involvement of a single employee. Bradley Birkenfeld, a U.S.
citizen, had worked for UBS as a private banker from 2001 to 2005.124 In 2007 he
approached the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
(“Subcommittee”) volunteering data on UBS’s private banking practices.125
Birkenfeld ultimately provided detailed information to prosecutors and to the
Subcommittee regarding UBS’s solicitation of clients in the United States.126
The 2008 report of the Subcommittee describes the lengths to which UBS
employees went to obtain new clients in the United States and to hide those
activities from the U.S. government. U.S. securities law requires persons who
provide securities products or services within the United States to be registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).127 UBS was licensed to
operate as a bank in the United States, and it had 437 offices in the United States
that could assist its U.S. clients.128 However, UBS’s banking and securities licenses
did not extend to its non-U.S. offices.129 Nevertheless, UBS instructed its Swiss
bankers to find new clients (and new money) in the United States and to encourage
those clients to open accounts in Switzerland.130 If a foreign financial institution
executes sales of non-U.S. securities, the institution must report the transaction to
the IRS on a Form 1099 if the sales are affected in the United States.131
During the years at issue, UBS had “written policies restricting the marketing
and client-related activities that could be undertaken in the United States by UBS
bankers from outside the country.”132 Despite these stated policies, UBS
encouraged and even paid for its Swiss bankers to travel to the United States to

121. Id.
122. See About Us: UBS in the World, UBS, http://www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs
/about_us/history/ubs-and-the-world.html.
123. SENATE REPORT, supra note 112, at 8.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 11–12.
128. Declaration of Daniel Reeves at 2, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D.
Fla. dismissed Aug. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Reeves Declaration], available at http://www
.justice.gov/tax/UBS_Declaration_DReeves.pdf.
129. SENATE REPORT, supra note 112, at 12.
130. Id. at 13.
131. Id. at 12.
132. Id.
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develop new business and service existing clients.133 According to the Senate
Report, Birkenfeld told the Subcommittee that, during his four years at UBS, the
private bankers from Switzerland typically traveled to the United States four to six
times per year, using their trips to recruit new clients and to provide financial
services to existing clients.134 Birkenfeld also testified that UBS provided its Swiss
bankers with tickets and funds to go to events attended by wealthy U.S. individuals
so that they could solicit new business for UBS in Switzerland.135 Indeed, UBS
regularly sponsored events in the United States like golf and tennis tournaments, art
fairs, and other special events in wealthy areas.136 These events were designed to
allow UBS bankers access to high-net-worth individuals. According to the
Subcommittee report, UBS also assigned its Swiss bankers specific performance
goals to bring “net new money” (NNM) into the Swiss bank from the United
States.137 According to the Subcommittee’s report:
A UBS business plan for the years 2003 through 2005, provides context
for the Swiss focus on obtaining U.S. clients. This document observes
that “31% of World’s UHNWIs [Ultra High Net Worth Individuals] are
in North America (USA + Canada).” It also observes that the United
States has 222 billionaires with a combined net worth of $706 billion.
This type of information helps explain why UBS dedicated significant
resources to obtaining U.S. clients for its private banking operations in
Switzerland. It also explains why the Swiss effort to attract billions to
their tax haven may have contributed to the huge tax loss to the U.S.
treasury.138
UBS also employed systems for its Swiss bankers so that their services for their
U.S. clients would not be discovered by U.S. authorities. UBS private bankers were
instructed to “keep a low profile during their business trips to avoid attracting
attention from U.S. authorities.”139 Some UBS Swiss private bankers who visited
the United States on business told U.S. customs officials that they were in the
country for nonbusiness reasons. UBS even provided its private bankers with
training on how to avoid surveillance by U.S. customs agents and law enforcement
officers.140 According to Birkenfeld, Swiss bankers took elaborate measures to
disguise or encrypt the account information they brought with them to prevent it
from falling into the wrong hands.141 Finally, contrary to U.S. laws and express
UBS policies, “some UBS Swiss bankers communicated with their U.S. clients by
telephone, fax, mail and email, to market securities products and services, and to
carry out securities transactions.”142

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
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Once accounts were opened, UBS took additional steps to ensure that the
accounts of U.S. clients were not discovered by the IRS or the SEC. UBS set up
secret bank accounts, so-called “undeclared accounts,” and it assured clients that
UBS was not required to disclose those accounts and account information was
shielded by Swiss bank secrecy laws.143 UBS not only maintained secret undeclared
accounts for U.S. clients but also took steps to assist its U.S. clients to structure
their Swiss accounts to avoid reporting to the IRS information required by the
Qualified Intermediary (QI) program.144 UBS provided private banking services to
approximately 20,000 clients, and nearly 19,000 of these clients concealed their
identities and their ownership of the accounts from the IRS.145 UBS reportedly
earned $200 million in fees per year from these accounts.146
As a result of the information provided by Birkenfeld, UBS entered into a
Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) in which it agreed to pay a fine of $780
million.147 As part of the DPA, UBS admitted that from 2002 until 2007, private
bankers and managers in the United States participated in a scheme to defraud the
IRS by assisting individual taxpayers in establishing accounts at UBS in a manner
designed to conceal the taxpayers’ ownership or beneficial interest in these
accounts.148 The private bankers helped create accounts in the names of offshore
companies, which allowed U.S. taxpayers to evade reporting requirements on these
accounts without being discovered by the IRS.149 “Although UBS AG signed a QI
agreement with the United States in 2001, UBS has never filed 1099 Forms
reporting these accounts to the IRS, contending that these U.S. client accounts fall
outside its QI reporting obligations.150 UBS refer[red] to these accounts internally
as ‘undeclared accounts.’”151 The IRS has alleged that UBS had 52,000 such
accounts.152 These accounts held billions of dollars that were not disclosed to the
IRS.153
Despite his contributions to the government’s case against UBS, Birkenfeld was
charged and pled guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States (a so-called
Klein conspiracy).154 The indictment charged Birkenfeld with falsifying Swiss bank

143. Id. at 83.
144. Id. at 87. Under the Qualified Intermediary Program, participating institutions
signed an agreement where they agreed to report and withhold U.S. taxes with respect to
U.S. taxpayers on an aggregate basis, in exchange for not being required to meet the legal
obligation to disclose the names of their non-U.S. clients. Id. at 3–4.
145. Id. at 84.
146. Carlyn Kolker & David Voreacos, Ex-UBS Banker Birkenfeld Pleads Guilty in Tax
Case (Update 3), BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2008, 2:47 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps
/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aLI2YNVAxDLM.
147. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 3, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033
(S.D. Fla. dismissed Oct. 25, 2010) [hereinafter UBS DPA], available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/tax/UBS_Signed_Deferred_Prosecution_Agreement.pdf.
148. Id. at Exhibit B.
149. Id. ¶ 21.
150. SENATE REPORT, supra note 112, at 9.
151. Id.
152. Reeves Declaration, supra note 128, ¶ 24.
153. Id.
154. Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Pleads Guilty in Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, June
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documents and IRS Forms, failing to prepare and issue required IRS Forms, setting
up nominee entities, and failing to comply with the terms of the QI program
agreement with the IRS in order to conceal from the IRS U.S.-source income paid
into Swiss bank accounts beneficially owned by U. S. taxpayers.155 Birkenfeld also
acted as a personal courier for his clients, at one point smuggling diamonds into the
United States in a toothpaste tube.156 He was sentenced to forty months in jail—an
extraordinary sentence for a whistleblower who, it can be argued, single-handedly
brought down UBS.157 However, Birkenfeld received $104 million as a whistleblower award from the IRS.158
In 2012, the government indicted Switzerland’s oldest bank, Wegelin Bank, and
three of its partners. They were charged with assisting U.S. taxpayers, many of
whom were former UBS clients, in evading their taxes.159 The indictments
appeared at first to be largely posturing by prosecutors, since Wegelin had no U.S.
presence and the individuals were unlikely to make themselves available for
extradition.160 As a result of the indictment, however, the bank essentially ceased to
exist as an independent entity within a month.161 In January 2013, Wegelin pled
guilty and formally ceased operations.162 The Department of Justice has
investigations pending against at least eleven other Swiss banks.163 Charges against
additional banks or bankers appear likely.
As with the tax shelter prosecutions, relatively few of the U.S. depositors have
been prosecuted.164 Instead, the IRS and DOJ offered qualified immunity in the
20, 2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/business/20tax.html?gwh
=8967C31D46029347101A930F4942DF51.
155. See Reeves Declaration, supra note 128, at Exhibit 31.
156. Browning, supra note 154.
157. Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 131 (2011); Morse, supra note 52, at 712 n.148.
158. David Kocieniewski, Get Out of Jail Free? No, It’s Better, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/business/whistle-blower
-awarded-104-million-by-irs.html?gwh=2F068C33CE1A7F435F2D42E2AF339C25.
159. Christoph Eisenring, Die Checkliste der US-Justiz, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG (Jan.
19, 2012), http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/wirtschaft/uebersicht/die-checkliste-der-us-justiz1.14406167; David Voreacos, Swiss Bank Wegelin Charged in U.S. with Aiding Tax
Evasion, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news
/2012-02-03/swiss-bank-wegelin-charged-in-u-dot-s-dot-with-aiding-tax-evasion; Robert W.
Wood, Judge Gives IRS Access to More Accounts at UBS and Wegelin, FORBES (Jan. 29,
2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/01/29/judge-gives-irsaccess-to-more-accounts-at-ubs-and-wegelin/.
160. See Wood, supra note 159.
161. Haig Simonian, Wegelin Becomes Victim of US Tax Dispute, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27,
2012, 5:13 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/864c58ca-48fc-11e1-88f0-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz21ZLScv2B.
162. Christoph Eisenring, Bank Wegelin: Sich Nicht In Falscher Sicherheit Wiegen,
NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG (Jan. 5, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/wirtschaft
/wirtschaftsnachrichten/-1--1.17922024.
163. James Shotter, Pictet Confirms DOJ Investigation, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2012, 7:39
PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e77d1aa6-37d7-11e2-8edf-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2JD
oEVXvQ.
164. Between December 2007 and June 2013, the government indicted approximately
eighty-five taxpayers for failing to disclose offshore accounts. Jack Townsend, Offshore
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form of a series of offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives.165 In an effort to obtain
the names of those U.S. taxpayers who held undeclared accounts at UBS, the U.S.
government filed a so-called John Doe summons.166 Significantly, the John Doe
summons litigation was resolved by agreement between the U.S. and the Swiss
governments (and not UBS).167
The tax haven bank prosecutions and offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives
have dramatically changed the way in which U.S. taxpayers view and utilize tax
haven banks.168 The decision to prosecute tax and banking professionals therefore
appears on many levels to be a success. But is the government’s new prosecution
policy the right one? The next two Parts will address this question.
III. THE NEW PROSECUTION POLICY AND CRIMINAL THEORY
It may seem credulous to ask whether prosecuting lawyers, accountants, and
bankers for assisting their clients in evading their taxes is the “right” policy.
However, the question of whether conduct should result in a criminal charge is
often not easy to answer.169 Indeed, legal thinkers and philosophers have long
Charges / Convictions Spreadsheet, FED. TAX CRIMES, http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com
(last modified Sept. 18, 2013). During that same period, the IRS accepted more than 33,000
offshore voluntary disclosures. See IRS Says Offshore Effort Tops $5 Billion, Announces
New Details on the Voluntary Disclosure Program and Closing of Offshore Loophole, I.R.S.
News Release IR-2012-64 (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Says
-Offshore-Effort-Tops-$5-Billion,-Announces-New-Details-on-the-Voluntary-Disclosure
-Program-and-Closing-of-Offshore-Loophole. But see Alison Bennett, Former Boeing Sales
Manager Pleads Guilty to Filing False Return, Hiding Assets in UBS, in 191 DAILY TAX
REPORT K–1 (2009); Florida Watchmaker to Pay $5 Million Fine for Failing to Disclose
Swiss UBS Accounts, 5 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. (BNA), Feb. 12, 2010, at 101; Stephen
Joyce, Former UBS Account Holder Admits to Concealing Assets to Evade Taxes, 5 WHITE
COLLAR CRIME REP. (BNA), Dec. 31, 2010, at 926.
165. See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, IRS Extends Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Deadline, in
124 TAX NOTES 1297 (2009).
166. A “John Doe summons” is a summons issued to a third party, like a bank, seeking
information regarding taxpayers whose identities are currently unknown to the IRS. In re
Tax Liabilities of John Does, 671 F.2d 977, 978 (6th Cir. 1982). Thus, the purpose of a John
Doe summons is not just to further an investigation of a given taxpayer. Rather, it is to find
out who the taxpayers are so that an investigation may be undertaken in earnest. JOHN A.
TOWNSEND, LARRY A. CAMPAGNA, STEVE JOHNSON, SCOTT A. SCHUMACHER, TAX CRIMES
224–26 (Paul L. Caron et al. eds., 2008). The John Doe summons procedures require the IRS
to convince a court that (1) the investigation relates to a particular person or ascertainable
group of persons; (2) there is reasonable cause to believe that the person or persons
identified may not have complied with the tax laws; and (3) the information sought is not
readily available from other sources. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(f) (2012).
167. Lynnley Browning, I.R.S. to Drop Suit Against UBS Over Tax Havens, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 2010, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/business/global
/27suisse.html.
168. For a more detailed treatment of this issue, see infra notes 297–307 and
accompanying text.
169. The government’s change in policy might arguably be sufficient to question the
propriety of the current policy; that is, if it is so obvious that Swiss bankers should be
prosecuted for assisting clients to hide money, why weren’t they prosecuted sooner?
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struggled with defining precisely what is and what should be criminal.170 The
challenge is to distinguish between actions that warrant criminal prosecution and
those that only justify civil penalties or no penalty at all. At its most basic, criminal
law should sanction conduct that is only unequivocally wrong or clearly
blameworthy.171 As H. L. A. Hart noted, “Why are certain kinds of action forbidden
by law and so made crimes or offences? The answer is: To announce to society that
these actions are not to be done and to secure that fewer of them are done.”172
At a minimum, before criminal liability can be imposed, the conduct in question
should be clearly distinguishable from conduct that is not subject to criminal
penalties.173 This clear distinction is essential to our criminal justice system.174
Doctrines such as the rule of lenity and void for vagueness,175 as well as the Ex
Post Facto Clause,176 all essentially ask whether the criminal statute in question has
made it reasonably clear that the defendant's conduct was criminal.177 In addition,
only upon criminal investigation or indictment will certain constitutional
protections be applied.178 Thus, a lack of clarity and firm definition of what is and
should be criminal is worrisome, given that so many rights and indeed some of the
greatest rights—life, liberty, and property—are dependent upon this distinction.179
Traditional definitions of what conduct is criminal requires that there be both an
actus reus and mens rea.180 There also must be a public element to the conduct,
since it is a violation of the public order of the State, the People, or the United
States in whose name the case is brought that makes a matter criminal.181 To

170. See, e.g., 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
POSITIVE LAW 518 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed. 1879); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE
OF PUNISHMENT 4 (Robert Heward 1830); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
(1968); Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ (revised May 13, 2013).
171. STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITECOLLAR CRIME 1 (2006).
172. HART, supra note 170, at 6.
173. GREEN, supra note 171.
174. See Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of
Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1275–76 (1998).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (describing these
doctrines as manifestations of a “fair warning requirement”).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Ex Post Facto Clause ensures that legislative acts
“give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until
explicitly changed.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28–29 (1981).
177. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 255 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (“Elementary considerations
of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to
conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”)
(citation omitted).
180. GREEN, supra note 171, at 10; see MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01, 2.02 (1985); see
also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding California law making it
illegal to be a drug addict unconstitutional because the mere status of being an addict was not
an act and thus not criminal).
181. Nonpublic or private wrongs are handled as torts. That said, some tortious actions
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borrow a phrase from Henry II’s time, it is the King’s peace that is being
violated.182 But on closer inspection, even these most basic definitions begin to
blur. If we assume that a crime must have some sort of act (actus reus), that
definition of crime breaks down in practice. For example, it is a crime to fail to file
a tax return.183 Thus, the “guilty act” in that crime is in reality the failure to act.184
One can also be guilty of attempts and other inchoate crimes, where the act has not
been completed or perfected. In these cases it is the desire to bring about the result,
rather than the act itself that is the crime.185
In conspiracy law the outer reaches of the actus reus requirement are
encountered. The essence of a conspiracy is the agreement itself.186 In order to
establish the existence of an agreement, the prosecution must show that the
defendant and at least one other person reached an understanding or agreement to
carry out the objective of the conspiracy.187 As long as a defendant understands the
unlawful nature of the scheme and knowingly and intentionally joins in that
scheme, that is sufficient to convict him or her for conspiracy. Thus, while we have
traditionally defined a crime as one that requires an actus reus and mens rea, in
modern conspiracy law a person can be convicted of a crime by merely agreeing to
participate in some future illegal venture.188 No act or failure to act by that person is
required.189
The ambiguity of criminal law is even more pronounced in the case of whitecollar crimes, where it is often difficult to determine whether the actions in
question should be subject to criminal liability. In this regard, Stuart Green stated:

that appear to be only between two private individuals can also be the basis of a criminal
case. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.011 (1997) (assault in the first degree).
182. Henry II used this ancient Anglo-Saxon concept to expand his authority over
criminal matters. Henry used the concept of the violation of the King’s Peace to obtain
jurisdiction over legal matters at the expense of the baronial courts. “[I]t was not until the
reign of Henry II (1154–1189) in England that national courts were developed, administering
law for the entire realm in vindication of the ‘King’s Peace’ through the King’s judges.”
Sheldon Glueck, The Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. REV. 396, 445
n.136 (1946) (citations omitted).
183. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2012).
184. The Model Penal Code defines actus reus to include omissions. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.01(1) (1985).
185. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 11.5(a)(2) (2d ed. 2003).
186. As Justice Jackson noted: “The modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it
almost defies definition. Despite certain elementary and essential elements, it also,
chameleon-like, takes on a special coloration from each of the many independent offenses on
which it may be overlaid. It is always ‘predominantly mental in composition’ because it
consists primarily of a meeting of minds and an intent.” Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440, 446–48 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Albert J.
Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 632 (1941)).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 161 (2d Cir. 1979).
188. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975).
189. United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 130–32 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that while
an overt act must be committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, the act need not be illegal in
and of itself, jury does not need to agree as to the overt act, and the act is not required to be
an element of the offense).
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[W]hat distinguishes “white-collar” offenses such as bribery,
obstruction of justice, perjury, and insider trading from core “blue
collar” offenses such as murder, rape, and assault is that the whitecollar crimes tend to be more “morally ambiguous” than the core
crimes. That is, in a surprisingly large number of cases there is genuine
doubt as to whether what the defendant did was in fact morally wrong.
In such cases, the issue is not, as it is with necessity, whether the
defendant was confronted with some extraordinary choice between
either obeying the law, and allowing significant harm to occur, or
violating the law, and preventing such harm. Rather, the question is
whether the conduct engaged in was more or less acceptable behavior
that should not have been subject to criminal sanctions in the first
place.190
Even if the focus was to shift from whether conduct should be subject to
criminal sanctions to whether conduct in fact falls within existing criminal statutes,
the answer is little clearer. When looking at the statutes regarding white-collar
crimes, the action not to be done191 is far from clear, and the line between what is
criminal and what is civil is blurred at best.
A good example is one of the oldest federal crimes, mail fraud.192 The mail
fraud statute provides in pertinent part: “Whoever, having devised or intending to
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,” uses the mails
for the purpose of executing the scheme, is guilty of a felony punishable by up to
twenty years in prison.193 What constitutes a scheme or artifice to defraud? Pretty
much any conduct, it seems. The Fifth Circuit “defined” this as any “conduct which
fails to match the ‘reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair
play and right dealing in the general and business life of members of society.’”194 It
has also been summarized as “an effort to gain an undue advantage or to bring
about some harm through misrepresentation or breach of duty.”195
What rights are protected and who should be protected from harm? Property?196
Honest services?197 Since the mail fraud statute is a criminal statute—a twenty-year
felony no less!—we must assume that it covers only conduct that is clearly
blameworthy.198 However, even a cursory tour through the case law in this area

190. Stuart P. Green, What Is Wrong with Tax Evasion?, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 221,
223 (2009) (footnote omitted).
191. HART, supra note 170, at 6.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
193. Id.
194. Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Gregory v.
United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958).
195. KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND
MATERIALS 88–89 (5th ed. 2011).
196. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (limiting the application of
§ 1341 to the protection of property rights).
197. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (applying the updated version
of § 1341 to the intangible right of honest services).
198. See GREEN, supra note 171, at 1.
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shows this not to be the case.199 “The federal criminal code is filled with crimes that
have neither common-law analogues nor well-established public meanings. Mail
fraud has no public definition, no Platonic form on which to model the relevant
criminal statute. Congress is free to define the crime as it wishes.”200
A. The Ambiguity of Tax Crimes
As Stuart Green has noted, tax crimes suffer from ambiguity in spades.201 This
ambiguity problem is both definitional and moral.202 Reducing one’s taxes through
“avoidance” measures or strategies is perfectly legal and long-accepted conduct,203
while reducing one’s taxes through “evasion” is a crime. However, the line between
legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion is often not clear.204 For example, it is a
crime to move assets out of the reach of the IRS to avoid the payment of taxes.205 If
a taxpayer knows the IRS is about to levy on a bank account, is it a crime for the
taxpayer not to deposit a paycheck into that bank account? Likely not. Is it a crime
to open a new bank account in the taxpayer’s name in the same city and deposit the
check in that account? Again, likely not. What about opening an account in another
city or another country? At this point, most would probably agree that a crime has
been committed. In each instance the taxpayer has taken actions to avoid (and
arguably evade) the payment of his or her taxes, and yet only the more egregious
actions are deemed to be criminal.
What differentiates legal avoidance from illegal evasion is the mental state of
the taxpayer. It is because the taxpayer intentionally violates a known legal duty
that his act is criminal.206 Thus, tax crimes, perhaps more than any other type of
crime, are illegal solely because of the mental state of the actor.207 While it is true
that nearly every crime requires a mens rea,208 the underlying conduct in nontax
crimes is at least frowned upon in its noncriminal guise.209 For example, while 18

199. See, e.g., Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2896 (conviction for honest-services fraud reversed).
200. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2567 (2004). I would add to this, prosecutors and courts are equally free
to define mail fraud as they wish. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2936–41 (Scalia, J., concurring).
201. Green, supra note 190, at 222.
202. Id. at 223, 227.
203. See, e.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
204. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775,
1782 (1999).
205. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012); Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 354 (1965).
206. But as Green has noted, this highest state of culpability allows a mistake or
ignorance of the law to be a defense, and as a result one can intentionally understate a tax
liability and not be guilty of a crime. Green, supra note 190, at 228. Thus, even the
heightened mental state, which was designed to prevent prosecutions for mere inadvertent or
mistaken violations of the tax laws, actually adds to its moral and legal ambiguity.
207. It is true that there is an actus reus, or at least an “omission reus,” element in every
tax crime. However, what distinguishes criminal evasion from legal avoidance is the mental
state of the actor. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012), with id. § 6662.
208. See HART, supra note 170, at 17–24 (explaining that those who lack fault should not
be liable to criminal punishment).
209. Even conspiracy, the essence of which is the agreement, is an agreement to do
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U.S.C. § 1001 criminalizes only knowingly and willfully making a materially false
statement to a government official, no one would argue that it is acceptable to make
nonwillful false statements to an FBI agent—it might not be a crime, but it is still
not acceptable behavior. By contrast, tax minimization is not generally frowned
upon and indeed is looked upon by many as a social good. Learned Hand’s
aphorism is a perfect example: “Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best
pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”210
Moreover, much of the professional tax services industry is based on the notion that
tax minimization is right and proper.211 Accordingly, precisely the same conduct
causing precisely the same harm212 can be criminal or not, depending on the mental
state of the taxpayer.
Basing prosecution decisions either solely or primarily on the mental state of the
person committing the act is even more troubling when the taxpayer is a
corporation. More than 100 years ago, the Supreme Court resolved the question of
whether corporations can commit crimes and held that if a corporation can enter
into contracts and lay railroad tracks, it can commit crimes.213 But in the context of
the tax crimes, how does a corporate defendant “know” what the tax laws require
and “intentionally” violate these laws? How can a corporation “know” the object of
a conspiracy and agree to join in it? In answering these questions, the First Circuit
stated:
The acts of a corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all of its
employees operating within the scope of their employment. The law on
corporate criminal liability reflects this. Similarly, the knowledge
obtained by corporate employees acting within the scope of their
employment is imputed to the corporation. Corporations
compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific
duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those
components constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular
operation. It is irrelevant whether employees administering one
component of an operation know the specific activities of employees
administering another aspect of the operation . . . .214
Thus, the legal fiction that a corporation is a person carries over to the “mental
state” of the corporate personage in the collective knowledge doctrine. 215 But as
something illegal. See, e.g., United Sates v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1089 (11th Cir. 2009).
210. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
211. The role of tax professionals assisting in tax minimization is enshrined in the rules
protecting taxpayers from accuracy-related civil penalties. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4 (2012).
212. Whether the “harm” is the same in these instances is debatable, depending upon how
one defines harm. The reduction of funds to the Treasury is the same; however, the blatant
abuse of the system is not.
213. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
214. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted).
215. See, e.g., Gregory L. Diskant, Trial Balloon: Rethinking Corporate Criminal
Liability, LITIGATION, Winter 2008, at 5; Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of OverCriminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The Dilemma of Artificial Entities and
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Professor David Luban noted, this doctrine “treats employees as synapses in the
nonexistent brain of a legal fiction,” where the corporation knows the sum of all of
the knowledge of its employees, whether or not they discussed what they knew or
actually combined their knowledge.216 Such a theory teeters on the “brink of quack
metaphysics or mystical science fiction, treating groups of people as single
minds.”217 Thus, tax crimes, when applied to corporations with multiple actors who
must collectively “know” the law and “intentionally” violate it, achieve the acme of
ambiguity. It is little wonder the Tax Division of the Department of Justice has a
stated policy preferring to prosecute individuals rather than corporations.218
B. Inconsistent Enforcement
Adding to the ambiguity of tax and other white-collar criminal statutes is the
inconsistent nature of white-collar criminal enforcement. No criminal law is
uniformly enforced, but this lack of uniformity is more pronounced in white-collar
criminal cases. Inconsistent and uneven enforcement is due not only to the limited
availability of resources,219 but also to structural reasons. White-collar crimes are
not like violent felonies, for which investigation and prosecution are almost
mandatory. Rather, for federal white-collar crimes, prosecution is almost always
optional.220 “Federal law is thus a source of options rather than obligations. With
very little in the way of legal or political constraints, federal prosecutors are the
criminal justice system’s free agents.”221 Thus, the “law” that federal prosecutors
make is much more likely a result of the prosecutors’ preferences than those of the
legislature.222
Tax crimes showcase the inconsistent enforcement of federal crimes. As
discussed, tax crimes are, in essence, violations of the tax laws where one does so
“willfully.”223 Thus, one can file an incorrect return and be subject to negligence
penalties or no penalties at all.224 However, if one willfully files an incorrect (read:
false) return, that could result in a criminal charge of filing a false tax return or tax
evasion.225 Similarly, if a person fails to file a tax return, a failure to file penalty
may be imposed.226 However, if that failure to file is willful, a criminal charge may

Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279 (2007).
216. David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 963–64 (1999).
217. Id. at 963.
218. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.400 (2008) [hereinafter
USAM], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9
/28mcrm.htm#9-28.40.
219. For example, the Criminal Tax Manual provides: “Because there are insufficient
resources to prosecute all violations, deterring others from violating the tax laws is a primary
consideration.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL § 1.01[4] (2008), available
at http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/2008ctm/CTM%20Chapter%201.pdf.
220. See Stuntz, supra note 200, at 2566.
221. Id. (emphasis in original).
222. See id. at 2567.
223. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
224. See, e.g., Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 480–86 (7th Cir. 2009).
225. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2012).
226. 26 U.S.C. § 6651 (2012).
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result.227 Thus, if a person knows of the legal duty to file and intentionally does not
do so, he or she is, under the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, guilty
of the misdemeanor of failure to file.
Yet very few tax violations that fit the literal definition are prosecuted or even
investigated as criminal cases. The proof of willfulness in a failure to file case can
be shown by the fact that the taxpayer filed in prior years, thereby demonstrating
the taxpayer knew of the duty to file.228 Without some excuse like illness or
incapacity, a failure to file case should be easy for the government to prove.
Nevertheless, remarkably few tax cases are investigated and prosecuted.229 And this
is not attributable to just the allocation of scarce resources, which, as indicated,
undoubtedly plays a role. This is not a case in which selling drugs is illegal, but
there are too many drug transactions for them all to be prosecuted. In those cases,
police and prosecutors do not maintain that the narcotics transaction is legal.
However, many cases that would clearly be provable as a tax crime are not even
viewed as criminal in nature by IRS personnel. Routine failures to file, even those
that have lasted a decade or more, are rarely thought to be criminal, unless the
taxpayer had illegal income or had some other aggravating factor.230 Indeed, in
cases of a failure to file of ten or more years, the IRS generally only asks for six
years of returns.231 IRS agents have a duty to refer cases for criminal investigation
where they have uncovered “firm indications of fraud,”232 but cases that are clearly
within that definition are nonetheless not consistently referred. It is not the mere
failure to file or omission of income that warrants a criminal referral.233 Rather, it
generally must be combined with some other fraudulent or obstructive act.234
Accordingly, the vagueness of tax crimes and other white-collar crimes must be
viewed not only from the perspective of not knowing what is illegal and will be
prosecuted, but also from the perspective that what is clearly illegal will not be
prosecuted. As discussed more fully below, this failure to prosecute clear violations
of the law gave some people the impression that they could act with impunity.

227. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2012).
228. United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 264 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Bok, 156
F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 1998).
229. In 2011, the IRS initiated only 4720 criminal investigations and recommended
prosecution in 3410 of these cases. Of those referred, the Justice Department issued 2998
indictments or informations. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2011 DATA BOOK 44 (2011),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11databk.pdf. During that same period, the IRS
asserted delinquency penalties in 3,736,987 cases. Id. at 42.
230. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 5.1.11.6.1 (2010),
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/.
231. See id.
232. See id. § 25.1.3.1 (2009).
233. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
234. Id. at § 4.23.9.6.2 (2008). Interestingly, this is much the same distinction as exists in
Swiss law. See Weber, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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C. The Problems with All This Vagueness
The vagueness of white-collar criminal statutes does not, of course, render every
prosecution immediately suspect. However, it is (or should be) a concern for
policymakers and anyone who has an interest in good government. Society will
lose faith in the criminal justice system if the law is perceived as being applied
arbitrarily or unfairly.235 The fundamental problem with the vagueness of these
statutes is that it shifts who ultimately defines what is criminal from the legislature
to prosecutors. This is not a new problem. As was noted more than 250 years ago,
“Nay whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws it
is he who is the lawgiver to all intents and purposes and not the person who first
wrote or spake them.”236
Thus, at one level, regardless of the merits of any given prosecution, the
“existence and exercise of prosecutorial discretion are inconsistent with the most
fundamental principles of our system of justice and our basic notions of fair play
and efficient criminal administration.”237 If a law is vague, anything or nothing fits
the definition. Prosecutors can tolerate conduct and then condemn it without any
justification. As Justice Jackson stated: “With the law books filled with a great
assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a
technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone.”238 The number and
breadth of federal crimes has exploded in the seventy years since that statement
was uttered. The vagueness of criminal statutes allows prosecutors, rather than
legislatures, to define what is criminal and what is not.
The presence of judge and jury to prevent convictions does not fully remedy this
problem. First, as has become more apparent with the work of programs such as the
Innocence Project around the country, innocent people do get convicted of crimes
they did not commit.239 Second, the gravity of the decision to charge cannot be
underestimated, for once a person is charged and becomes a “defendant,” his or her
life will never be the same again. And, as the prosecution of Arthur Andersen
proved, for institutional targets indictment alone can be a death sentence.240

235. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME (1995).
236. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141 (2d ed. 1994) (attributing the quote to
Bishop Hoadly).
237. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1554 (1981).
238. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 19 (1940).
239. See, e.g., Sara Jean Green, 3 Convicted in State Cleared, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 21,
2010, at B1, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2013726446
_innocence21m.html.
240. Arthur Andersen, formerly the world’s largest accounting firm, shut down within
months of its indictment, even before its trial and conviction. “During such time, there was
considerable debate within the DOJ as to the legal, practical, and moral consequences of
indictments against corporate defendants. Those discussions emphasized that while corporate
wrongdoers needed to be brought to justice, regulators also needed to carefully consider the
collateral consequences of corporate prosecutions.” John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The
Recent and Unusual Evolution of an Expanding FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 25, 31 (2012).
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Thus, the pervasive ambiguity in criminal statutes is a cause for concern. Most
of the literature in this area addresses overenforcement of criminal law and the
disparate treatment that decisions to prosecute entail.241 However, it is also
necessary to examine the impact of underenforcement and the decision not to bring
prosecutions.242 Underenforcement, among other problems, erodes citizens’ beliefs
in and commitment to follow the law and to the legal system itself.243 And while
much of the scholarship in this area has been focused on the impact enforcement
failures have had on so-called “underenforcement zones” and the racial and ethnic
minorities within these communities, underenforcement can also impact the laws
themselves.244
There is perhaps no better example of the impact of underenforcement on
citizens’ views of the law than in tax enforcement.245 The decades of tolerating the
tax shelter industry contributed to its expansion, leading to a situation in which the
best and brightest in the tax field were creating transactions out of whole cloth that
generated losses in the hundreds of millions of dollars.246 Likewise, tolerance of, or
at least indifference to, offshore bank accounts led at least in part to their
expansion.247
D. Prosecution Policies
Given the vagueness of criminal statutes, particularly tax and other white-collar
criminal statutes, it is essential that prosecutors be guided by definite prosecution
policies. What, then, should prosecutors consider in deciding whether and whom to
prosecute? While a full treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of this paper, a
few fundamentals can be gleaned. As Professor Antony Duff stated:
[T]he most plausible immediate good that a system of punishment can
bring is the prevention of crime: a rational consequentialist system of
law will define as criminal only conduct that is in some way harmful; in
preventing crime we will thus be preventing the harms that crime
causes; and punishment can prevent crime by incapacitating, or
deterring, or reforming potential offenders.248

241. See e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH L.
REV. 505 (2001).
242. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1717 (2006).
243. Id. at 1750.
244. See id. at 1717–18.
245. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and
Taxpayer Noncompliance, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 500, 502 (2007); see also Joshua D. Blank &
Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2010).
246. The millions of dollars in fees these tax professionals collected undoubtedly had
something to do with the popularity of these transactions as well.
247. See Lee Sheppard, Our Hypocrisy on Tax Havens, FORBES (July 22, 2010, 5:34 PM),
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/22/tax-finance-havens-economy-opinions
-columnists-lee-sheppard.html.
248. Duff, supra note 170, § 3.
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Thus, criminal law seeks to incapacitate offenders, deter future offenses, reform
offenders, and obtain retribution on behalf of victims.249
The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual instructs federal prosecutors to pursue a criminal
prosecution only if the person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense and
admissible evidence will “probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a
conviction.”250 The only limits placed on this broad grant of authority is that a
prosecution should nevertheless not be pursued if there is no “substantial federal
interest” involved in the case, the person is subject to effective prosecution
elsewhere, or there is a sufficient noncriminal alternative to prosecution.251 The
definition of “substantial federal interest” instructs prosecutors that in determining
whether there is a substantial federal interest, a prosecutor should weigh all relevant
considerations, including: federal law enforcement priorities, the nature and
seriousness of the offense, the deterrent effect of the prosecution, and the target’s
culpability.252
These prosecution policies are further amplified by the policies concerning the
investigation and prosecution of business entities. This policy instructs that the
prosecution of corporate crime is a “high priority” for the Department of Justice.253
It then outlines the “critical public interests” that are promoted by the investigation
and prosecution of business entities, including: (1) protecting the integrity of the
capital markets, (2) protecting consumers, investors, and competing business
entities, and (3) protecting the environment.254
The Criminal Tax Case Procedures in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual is even more
explicit in defining a prosecution policy in tax cases:
The Government helps to preserve the integrity of this Nation’s selfassessment tax system through vigorous and uniform criminal
enforcement of the internal revenue laws. Criminal prosecutions punish
tax law violators and deter other persons who would violate those laws.
To achieve maximum deterrence, the Government must pursue broad,
balanced, and uniform criminal tax enforcement. Uniformity in tax
cases is necessary because tax enforcement potentially affects more
individuals than any other area of criminal enforcement.255
Thus, the government’s prosecution policies, particularly the Tax Division’s policy,
follow the traditional bases for criminal liability: retribution and deterrence,
particularly general deterrence. The importance of general deterrence in tax cases
has been codified in the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s sentencing guidelines,
which provide:

249. Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323,
325 (2004). In recent years rehabilitation of the offender has been abandoned as a
justification for punishment. See, e.g., D.A. Andrews & James Bonta, Rehabilitating
Criminal Justice Policy and Practice, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 39 (2010).
250. USAM, supra note 218, § 9-27.220.
251. Id.
252. Id. § 9-27.230.
253. Id. § 9-28.100.
254. Id.
255. Id. § 6-4.010.
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The criminal tax laws are designed to protect the public interest in
preserving the integrity of the nation’s tax system. Criminal tax
prosecutions serve to punish the violator and promote respect for the
tax laws. Because of the limited number of criminal tax prosecutions
relative to the estimated incidence of such violations, deterring others
from violating the tax laws is a primary consideration underlying these
guidelines. Recognition that the sentence for a criminal tax case will be
commensurate with the gravity of the offense should act as a deterrent
to would-be violators.256
The Tax Division’s policy, however, departs somewhat from traditional
rationales in that the stated purpose of the criminal enforcement program is also “to
preserv[e] the integrity” of the civil tax system.257 The policy also specifically
provides that maximum deterrence depends upon uniform and consistent criminal
enforcement.258 Hence, the Tax Division is the only division authorized to approve
an indictment for tax crimes, and an individual U.S. attorney may not bring a tax
prosecution without the approval of the Tax Division.259 As discussed above, the
government’s prosecution policy did not always preserve the integrity of the tax
system.260
Finally, in deciding whether to proceed against an entity or the individuals who
took the actions on behalf of the entity, the Department of Justice looks at the
nature and seriousness of the offense committed, the pervasiveness of wrongdoing
within the entity, including whether high-level management condoned the conduct,
and the entity’s history of similar misconduct.261 Examining these factors allows
the government to decide whether the actions are those of rogue individuals within
the entity or if the conduct is such that it can be said that the entity itself committed
the criminal act. The government also examines whether the entity timely and
voluntarily disclosed the wrongdoing and cooperated in the investigation, whether
the entity had a viable compliance program, and whether the entity took remedial
action.262 These factors tend to show whether the problems within the entity are
systemic, and therefore should be attributed to the entity, or whether they are
isolated instances that have been corrected. Finally, in deciding whether to pursue
criminal, rather than civil sanctions, prosecutors will examine the collateral

256. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 2, pt. T,
introductory cmt. (2012) (emphasis added), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines
/2012_Guidelines/index.cfm.
257. As discussed more fully below, preserving the integrity of the tax system is closely
related to general deterrence. See infra text accompanying notes 254–68.
258. USAM, supra note 218, § 6-4.010.
259. Id.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 20–38, 65–68, 246–248; U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 3 (1999) (“A view that well-advised corporations can and do avoid
their legal tax liabilities by engaging in these tax-engineered transactions may cause a ‘race
to the bottom.’ If unabated, this could have long-term consequences to our voluntary tax
system far more important than the revenue losses we currently are experiencing . . . .”).
261. USAM, supra note 218, § 9-28.300.
262. Id.
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consequences of a prosecution on third parties such as shareholders, pension
holders, employees, and others who are not culpable; the adequacy of the
prosecution of individuals responsible; and the adequacy of civil remedies.263 In
addition to the factors applicable to all federal prosecutions, Department of Justice
policy provides that the Tax Division has a “strong preference for prosecuting
responsible individuals, rather than entities, for corporate tax offenses.”264
Accordingly, if we are to judge—and judge we will—the government’s new
prosecution policy regarding professionals using the government’s own articulated
bases, the following standards will be weighed: (1) culpability of the person
charged, including the person’s relative culpability in relation to other actors not
charged; (2) retribution, including compensation of the crime victim; (3) deterrent
effect (especially general deterrence) that would result from the prosecution; and
(4) protection of the integrity of the civil tax system.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW PROSECUTION POLICY
Before analyzing the soundness of the tax shelter and tax haven prosecutions, a
threshold question must be asked: Were the decisions to bring a series of criminal
prosecutions where, in the past, no such prosecution would likely have been
brought, a change in policy, or were these decisions based on the egregious facts of
these cases? The answer is, I think, a little of both. It was because of the egregious
facts, enormous dollar amounts involved, and the complicity of the upper echelons
of the tax profession that caused the government to change its policies. Moreover,
“the government” is not a monolithic entity detached from the human beings who
run it. Thus, the change in policy can in part be traced to the individuals who were
the decision makers in the Tax Division and other parts of the Justice
Department.265
That being said, these prosecutions do not appear to be isolated instances or
anomalies. More than seven years after the KPMG deferred prosecution agreement,
the government is still pursuing tax professionals for their roles in peddling abusive
tax shelters.266 The government continues to go after Swiss banks; the indictment
and conviction of Wegelin Bank,267 and the deferred prosecution agreement with
HSBC Bank268 are the most recent examples. While the government continues to

263. Id.
264. Id. § 9-28.400.
265. See, e.g., Blank & Levin, supra note 245, at 22–23 (noting the role of then Assistant
Attorney General Eileen O’Connor in tax enforcement policies).
266. See, e.g., Bob Van Voris & David Glovin, BDO Seidman to Pay $50 Million in
BUSINESSWEEK
(June
14,
2012),
Deferred
Prosecution,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-13/bdo-seidman-to-pay-50-million-indeferred-prosecution.
267. See Neate, supra note 16.
268. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, HSBC Holdings Plc.
and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations,
Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter
HSBC Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm
-1478.html.
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prosecute a few individual taxpayers for hiding money offshore,269 the IRS offered
its third offshore voluntary disclosure initiative in 2012.270 Thus, the policy of
prosecuting professionals has continued with the change of administrations, and it
appears that this policy will continue into the future. Assuming that is the case, are
these prosecutions consistent with the goals and theories underlying federal
criminal prosecutions in general and tax prosecutions in particular?
A. Tax Shelters
1. Relative Culpability
In examining the culpability of the professionals and their relative culpability
vis-à-vis their clients, the decision to go after the professionals and not the
taxpayers themselves was the right choice. It is the role of tax professionals to
know what is an acceptable structure and what is pure tax fantasy. Circular 230 and
the Rules of Professional Conduct impose a duty on tax attorneys and other
professionals to advise clients only on legitimate transactions.271 And it is the tax
professionals who have the background, knowledge, and experience to know which
transactions are legitimate and which are not. What was truly egregious about these
transactions is that not only did the professionals misapply the law, they created the
“facts” underlying these bogus transactions.272
The tax system has long accepted that taxpayers may rely on the advice of the
professionals they hire.273 And, given the complexity and obtuseness of the tax
laws, taxpayers cannot be faulted for relying on their advisors in what appear to be
artificial transactions. Taxpayers enter into transactions structured in a way to
maximize tax benefits because they have been advised by tax professionals to
structure them in that way. For example, businesspeople do not really need
structures like S Corporations for their business operations, but they have been
advised that this is a tax-efficient way to set up a business. And if they find the
documents they sign and the structures they are advised to create a bit strange, they
simply believe this is one of the many mysterious things about the way the tax
system works. If they are then told that they cannot structure a transaction in a
certain way because it was done solely for tax purposes, they may be left more than
a little perplexed. As Professor Freedman observed:

269. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, South Florida
Woman Pleads Guilty to Failing to Disclose Income from Swiss Bank Accounts and Agrees
to $21 Million Penalty (Jan. 8, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013
/January/13-tax-030.html.
270. See IRS Offshore Programs Produce $4.4 Billion to Date for Nation’s Taxpayers;
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Reopens, I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5 (Jan. 9,
2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Offshore-Programs-Produce-$4.4-Billion
-To-Date-for-Nation%E2%80%99s-Taxpayers;-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program
-Reopens.
271. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.22, .34, .35 (2011).
272. See, e.g., KPMG DPA, supra note 7, at ¶ 2.
273. See Schumacher, supra note 34, at 42–44.
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What message are such people being given by the tax system? Are they
to think of tax in terms of economic reality, fairness and rationality
when it at first appears that incorporation will legitimately save tax and
they then find that some of those benefits have been negated in a
complex way that will probably cost them considerable amounts in
professional fees? The law has real substance here because it has
consequences in terms of rights and obligations. . . . Right from the
start he has been given a signal that it is necessary to take account of
taxation when making commercial decisions and that the rules can
change. The culture of artificiality is established and so it continues. . . .
In the light of this, it is not surprising that business owners will soon
come to believe that it is perfectly natural to do artificial things for tax
purposes and that this impression permeates right up the scale to large
companies whose directors, used to tax impacting on all their decisions,
consider it fair game to take tax into consideration in all planning and
then to go on to undertake tax driven activities.274
If the transactions these taxpayers entered into looked artificial and were entered
into solely for tax purposes, the response of many of these taxpayers would quite
innocently be, “so what’s your point?” Thus, in examining the culpability and
relative culpability, the professionals were the appropriate target.
Nevertheless, prosecutors, particularly those with ultimate decision-making
authority, must be circumspect in using the prosecution of lawyers to deter the
conduct of clients. As discussed above, the line between legal conduct and illegal
conduct can be quite slim and vague. Statutes that prohibit impeding “the due
administration” of the tax laws275 may apply to legal conduct, as well as nefarious
conduct.276 The prosecution of Lauren Stevens is an apt example of the principle
that one person’s representation is another one’s fraud.277
2. Compensating the Victim
The strategy of targeting the most culpable for criminal prosecution, while
imposing stiff civil penalties on the taxpayers who benefited from these schemes,
netted large amounts of money for the government. Approximately 2000 taxpayers

274. Judith Freedman, Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General AntiAvoidance Principle, [2004] B.T.R. 332, 344–45.
275. 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (2012).
276. See, e.g., Schumacher, supra note 19.
277. Lauren Stevens, former vice president and associate general counsel of
pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), had been charged with obstruction of justice
and making false statements during a civil investigation of GSK by the Food and Drug
Administration. Id. At the close of the government’s case, the district court dismissed the
case against Stevens, holding that the statements were made in the course of her bona fide
legal representation of a client and in good-faith reliance on both external and internal
lawyers for GSK. Transcript of Proceedings at 5, United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d
556 (D. Md. 2011) (No. 8:10-cr-00694-RWT). The court further held that “only with a
jaundiced eye and with an inference of guilt that’s inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence could a reasonable jury ever convict this defendant” and that “it would be a
miscarriage of justice to permit this case to go to the jury.” Id. at 8–9.
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who invested in twenty-one different tax shelters accepted the IRS’s global
settlement terms and paid over $2 billion in back taxes and interest.278 In addition,
nearly eighty-five percent of taxpayers known by the IRS to have invested in the
Son of BOSS tax shelter elected to settle under a different program and paid more
than $4 billion in taxes, penalties, and interest.279 Part of what was so galling about
these shelters was the amount of money involved in the transactions and the place
the lawyers and accountants occupied in the profession. These were some of the
most well-heeled taxpayers and the most successful tax practitioners.280 Ironically,
from a restitution perspective, the wealth and success of the professionals, their
firms, and the taxpayers themselves allowed the government to be compensated at a
relatively high rate.281 Thus, while not all shelters were discovered and targeted, the
ones that were detected netted a decent return for the government. From the
perspective of compensating the victim, the strategy employed was effective.
3. Deterrence
Arguably the strongest and best reason for prosecuting the tax advisors is the
deterrent effect of these cases. As discussed above, general deterrence is the
primary objective in tax prosecutions.282 Given the large number of taxpayers,283
and the relatively few tax prosecutions each year, the prosecutions that are brought
must dissuade others, many others, from committing a similar crime. Prosecuting
tax professionals accomplishes this objective, only more so: the tax shelter
transactions would not have been possible without the participation of the lawyers,
accountants, and bankers. Even the most sophisticated taxpayers would not have
dreamt up the structures and transactions of these shelters. And, without the legal
documents and counterparties created by the facilitators, the transactions could not
have been carried out. Perhaps even more importantly, the taxpayers would not
have entered into these transactions without the tax opinions drafted by the lawyers
and accountants.284 Thus, the professionals were central to execution of these
schemes.

278. Stephen Joyce, About 2,000 Taxpayers to Pay $2 Billion in Global Settlement
Initiative, Everson Says, 59 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Mar. 28, 2006, at G-2.
279. Robust Response for Executive Stock Option Initiative; Son of Boss Settlement
Heading for $4 Billion, I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-72 (July 11, 2005) available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Robust-Response-for-Executive-Stock-Option-Initiative;--Son-ofBoss-Settlement-Heading-for-$4-Billion; see also I.R.S. Announcement 2004-46, 2004-21
I.R.B. 964; Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implications for Tax
Compliance, 58 AM. U. L .REV. 267, 268 n.1 (2008).
280. See Rostain, supra note 33, at 88–93.
281. For example, KPMG paid $256 million of the $456 million fine and restitution within
a week of signing the Deferred Prosecution Agreement. See KPMG DPA, supra note 7, ¶ 3. By
contrast, billions of dollars of court-ordered restitution still remain unpaid. See, e.g., Daniel M.
Fetsco, Unpaid Restitution: An Under-Enforced Right of Victims and Suggestions to Improve
the Collection of Restitution in Wyoming, 12 WYO. L. REV. 367, 368 (2012).
282. See supra text accompanying note 253.
283. More than 234 million tax returns were filed in 2011. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
supra note 229, at 4.
284. See, e.g., Schumacher, supra note 34, at 43–44.
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Shutting down the professionals effectively shut down the shelters.285 And this,
whether intentional or not, is ultimately the wisdom of these prosecutions.
Prosecuting professionals deters not only taxpayers, but also other professionals
from advising on these types of abusive transactions.286 Since professionals are the
enablers and taxpayers cannot enter into these transactions without the
professionals, the current prosecution policy is likely to be more effective than
pursuing the taxpayers themselves. Moreover, given that there are far fewer
professionals than taxpayers, prosecuting professionals can achieve both specific
and general deterrence more efficiently than prosecuting taxpayers. Thus, the
prosecutions of professionals causes a ripple effect beyond the normal tax
prosecution.287
4. Preserving the Integrity of the Tax System
Finally, the decision to bring criminal cases against the lawyers and accountants
helped to preserve and indeed restore the integrity of the tax system.288 The longterm decision not to prosecute investors in tax shelters or their advisors led, at least
in part, to the rise of shelters.289 During the 1990s, in response to the competitive
pressure in the auditing field, the national accounting firms dedicated tremendous
amounts of resources to retaining the best and brightest in the tax community.290
These professionals were not put into the traditional auditing roles, but were
assigned to the tax shelter “consulting” practices.291 Those practices became large
profit centers for the firms.292 Without the specter of liability, either civil, criminal,
or professional, these shelters grew in complexity and egregiousness. For example,
in an internal memorandum, a KPMG partner acknowledged that the strategy at
issue was a “tax shelter” and subject to registration as such under 26 U.S.C. §
6111.293 However, the partner recommended that it not be registered, reasoning that

285. See Fleischer, supra note 107.
286. See Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax
Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 962 n.4 (2006).
287. Of course, the criminal investigations and prosecutions were not the only tool
employed by the government against professionals. See supra note 263 and accompanying
text. The heightened ethical standards in some of the deferred prosecution agreements, which
of course were part and parcel of these investigations and prosecutions, further reinforced the
lessons of the indictments. See, e.g., KPMG DPA, supra note 7, at 7. However, the specter
of criminal prosecution of high-level tax professionals was definitely a game changer.
288. Much of the analysis regarding the deterrent effect of these prosecutions discussed
immediately above applies with equal force here.
289. See Rostain, supra note 33, at 86–94.
290. Id. at 89–91.
291. See id.
292. See id. By 2002, revenues from tax services at the Big Four accounting firms were
between 21% and 36% of the firms’ total revenue, representing between $1.1 and $1.6
billion. Id. at 91.
293. See Justice Releases 1998 KPMG Memo on OPIS Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec.
15, 2003, available at Lexis, 2003 TNT 240-52 (reproducing a memorandum from Gregg W.
Ritchie, KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, to Jeffrey N. Stein, KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (May 26,
1998; released Dec. 11, 2003)).
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the firm’s financial exposure was minimal, other promoters were not registering tax
shelters, registering would put the firm at a “severe competitive disadvantage,” and
that the IRS had shown a “lack of enthusiasm” for enforcing the registration
requirements.294 In the end, firms admitted to creating these transactions out of
whole cloth.295
These cases were worse for the system than prior shelters. The involvement of
the best professionals in these cases threatened the very fabric of the tax system.
The corrosive effect of the sense that “everybody is doing it,” especially when
“everybody” includes the top professionals, cannot be underestimated. One of the
beliefs of many taxpayers is that only a fool pays the full amount of tax, or as
Leona Helmsley so eloquently stated, “Only the little people pay taxes.”296 And
there is a belief that if we only find the right tax advisor, we will only be required
to pay that which we are constitutionally obligated to forfeit.297 If tax professionals
believe that they are fools if they don’t give a tax opinion when everyone else is
giving them, the entire system breaks down.
The decision to prosecute helped to restore that equilibrium. Of course, criminal
prosecution was not the only arrow in the government’s quiver. These prosecutions
were accompanied by several changes to the rules governing practice before the
IRS, new civil penalties, and aggressive investigations of shelter promoters.298
5. Summary
Accordingly, the decision to investigate and prosecute tax professionals for their
roles in marketing abusive tax shelters was consistent with the goals of tax
enforcement and with the theories underlying criminal liability. The victim, the
American taxpayer, was compensated. Those that caused the harm were punished.
Taxpayers could not have dreamed up these transactions or implemented them
without the professionals. Thus, from both an allocation of blame and a general
deterrence perspective, pursuing the professionals was the right choice. Finally, the
change in prosecution policies, along with the other changes in ethical rules and
conditions placed in the DPAs, helped to restore the integrity of the civil tax
system. No longer will a professional, or at least a sane one, advise a client to enter
into a transaction like COBRA, BLIPS, or SOS.299 The fact that some of the most
high-profile defendants were not convicted does not diminish the appropriateness
of the decision to prosecute.300

294. Id.
295. See, e.g., KPMG DPA, supra note 7, ¶ 2.
296. Maid Testifies Helmsley Denied Paying Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1989, at B2
(quoting Leona Helmsley).
297. See Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, in 10 INST. ON FED. TAX’N 1067,
1074 (1952) (“Most people think of us as having a bag of tricks that greatly reduces our
clients’ taxes and probably gets us out altogether on our own.”).
298. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2011); Blank & Levin, supra
note 245.
299. See Lederman, supra note 77 (describing types of these shelters).
300. The methods used by some prosecutors are, of course, subject to criticism. See
United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 143 (2d Cir. 2008).
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B. Tax Havens
1. Relative Culpability
The soundness of the decision to prosecute Swiss banks and bankers, while
largely absolving—at least criminally—the U.S. taxpayers who hid money in these
banks, is not so clear. This is not, of course, to excuse the conduct of UBS and
other offshore bankers. UBS admitted that it violated its QI agreement and its own
express internal policies.301 The actions taken by UBS staff, with the apparent
complicity of management, were clearly unlawful. UBS used its Swiss bankers to
recruit high-net-worth individuals in the U.S. in violation of U.S. securities laws,
and it assisted U.S. taxpayers in setting up accounts at UBS in a manner designed
to conceal the taxpayers’ ownership or beneficial interest in these accounts.302 It
failed to issue a Form 1099 for these accounts, in violation of its QI agreement with
the IRS.303 Thus, the culpability of UBS and its bankers cannot be disputed. And it
could be argued that UBS got off easy. The $780 million fine was not crippling,304
and UBS was not, in fact, indicted.305 However, in examining the relative
culpability of UBS vis-à-vis the U.S. depositor, it is less clear that offshore banks
and bankers should be held criminally responsible, while U.S. taxpayers largely get
a pass. Like the tax shelter advisers, the bankers’ misconduct is derivative—it
occurs only because they helped U.S. taxpayers evade or avoid their obligations
under the law. However, unlike the tax shelter cases, where clients relied on the
advice of the tax professionals, those taxpayers who intentionally hid money in
UBS knew what they were doing was illegal. These wealthy, sophisticated
taxpayers cannot legitimately claim that they relied on the advice of Swiss bankers
that they need not report the existence of an offshore account or the income from
the account.306 There is little gray area in this issue.307

301. SENATE REPORT, supra note 112, at 9–13.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 9.
304. UBS had a net profit for just the first quarter of 2011 of nearly $2.06 billion.
Deborah Ball, WALL ST. J., UBS Reassures, Despite Fall in Profit (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703778104576286162911746324.html. In
addition, as of the end of 2008, Swiss Banks held assets of $1.84 trillion. Mathieu von Rohr,
Bank Secrecy Gives Way in Switzerland, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 3, 2009),
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2009/gb2009033_255906.htm.
305. Compare the fate of Arthur Andersen, which received the “corporate death penalty”
by its indictment. See Ashcroft & Ratcliffe, supra note 240.
306. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4(b) (2012) (Taxpayers may rely on advice of tax professionals
if reliance is reasonable. “Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith
include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts
and circumstances . . . .”). This is not to say that all taxpayers who failed to declare an offshore
account did so knowing that it was in violation of the law. Many less sophisticated taxpayers,
some of whom inherited accounts from parents or kept accounts in their home country after
immigrating to the United States, did not know of the requirement to report these accounts. See,
e.g., Janet Novack, IRS Cuts Middle Class Expats Big (and Deserved) Penalty Break, FORBES
(June 26, 2012, 7:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2012/06/26/irs-cuts
-middle-class-expats-big-and-deserved-penalty-break/.
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Thus, in examining the relative culpability of the actors in this transaction, it is
difficult to argue that the bankers were more culpable than their U.S. clients.308
This is particularly so when Swiss law is considered. As discussed above, Swiss
law makes it a crime for bankers to divulge their customer’s name, the type of bank
account, the transactions the client entered into, and any information supplied by
the customer in connection with the account to a foreign government.309 In
addition, failure to report income or the existence of a bank account is not a crime
under Swiss law.310 The distinction between “tax fraud,” which is a crime under
Swiss law, and tax evasion, which is not, was included in the Swiss-U.S. Tax
Treaty.311 Under the treaty, the Swiss government had no duty to provide bank
account information under cases of “mere” tax evasion.312 Thus, while the actions
of UBS violated U.S. law, its actions were consistent with Swiss law and arguably
not inconsistent with the tax treaty between the United States and Switzerland.313
In addition, it can be dangerous for prosecutors to wade into the murky waters of
diplomacy and international relations.314 Indeed, the UBS case caused a backlash in
Switzerland,315 and many have argued that the conduct of the foreign banks and
bankers is little different from the conduct of U.S. banks.316 Under U.S. tax laws,
307. While U.S. depositors may not have relied on professionals regarding whether
hiding money offshore is legal, these depositors often relied on bankers and lawyers to help
them structure transactions in order to better hide their money from the IRS. See, e.g.,
Patricia Hurtado & David Voreacos, Swiss Lawyer’s Guilty Plea Disclosures Help Advance
IRS Tax Evasion Crackdown, 8 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. (BNA), Aug. 23, 2013, at 584. In
this regard, the professionals are equally as culpable, if not more culpable, than their clients.
308. It is true that U.S. depositors were listed as “unindicted co-conspirators” in the
Information filed against UBS. See UBS DPA, supra note 147, at Exhibit B, at 9. Yet,
government policies allowed the vast majority of these depositors to escape criminal
prosecution. Cf. Seven UBS Clients Charged with Hiding More than $100 Million in Swiss
Accounts, 72 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Apr. 16, 2010, at K-1.
309. SWISS PENAL CODE, supra note 45.
310. See Weber, supra note 5.
311. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income, U.S.-Switz., art. 26, Oct. 2, 1996, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/swiss.pdf.
312. See id.
313. And as my colleague Anita Ramasastry noted, “Swiss banks are not to be held
responsible for being global policemen.” Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 333.
314. The conduct of the bankers did not violate international law. If they acted
appropriately under Swiss law and consistent with then-existing treaties, should prosecutors
wade into this area and start prosecuting people? The court in Arc Ecology v. United States
Department of the Air Force held that when the Executive Branch is the party advancing a
construction of a statute with potential foreign policy implications, a court can presume that
“the President has evaluated the foreign policy consequences of such an exercise of U.S. law
and determined that it serves the interests of the United States.” 411 F.3d 1092, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1179 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Nevertheless, notions of international comity would suggest that prosecutors exercise
discretion in these cases. There is some indication that these cases have damaged our
relationship with Switzerland. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, Anger Grows in Switzerland Over
DOJ Efforts to Force UBS to Give Details on U.S. Clients, 34 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Feb.
24, 2009, at I-4.
315. See Pruzin, supra note 314.
316. See Sheppard, supra note 247.
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interest income on accounts held by nonresident aliens is not taxable.317 U.S. banks
are therefore not required to, and do not, issue 1099 Forms with respect to these
accounts.318 Thus, “the United States does not and cannot provide information to
any of its tax treaty or [Tax Information Exchange Agreement] TIEA partners
(except Canada) concerning interest paid on deposits by their residents in U.S. bank
accounts.” 319 As a result, the United States is one of the favorite places of
foreigners to hide their money.320 In fact, in a letter dated February 9, 2009, the
Mexican Secretary of Finance, Agustin Carstens, complained to U.S. Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner that U.S. banks are being used by Mexican taxpayers,
including drug dealers, to hide their ill-gotten gains.321 Commentators have listed
states like Nevada, Delaware, and Wyoming as tax havens,322 and even recent
proposals to impose “know your customer” duties on U.S. banks have been met
with opposition.323 More egregious is the HSBC case, in which the U.S. subsidiary
of the British-based bank failed to maintain adequate anti-money-laundering
procedures, which allowed hundreds of millions of dollars of narco-profits to be
laundered through the U.S. banking system.324 Accordingly, while the conduct of
UBS and others should not be excused, in examining their relative culpability, they
are no more culpable than their U.S. clients, most of whom were not prosecuted.

317. 26 U.S.C. § 871(i) (2012). This is part of deliberate strategy to attract foreign
capital, and this exemption is maintained knowing full well that the foreign depositors are
not paying taxes on the income from these accounts. See, e.g., Michael J. McIntyre, How to
End the Charade of Information Exchange, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 255, 258 (2009).
318. See, e.g., Marshall J. Langer, Pending Stop Haven Abuse Act Would Wrongly
Blacklist Cooperating Countries, 56 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Mar. 26, 2009, at J-1.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Letter from Agustin Carstens, Mex. Fin. Sec’y, to Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury
Sec’y, Requesting Automatic Exchange of Information (Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://
faculty.law.wayne.edu/tad/Documents/Country/mexico-carstens_letter.pdf, quoted in McIntyre,
supra note 317, at 258; see also Robert Goulder, How the U.S. Is a Tax Haven for Mexico’s
Wealthy, TAX ANALYSTS (Aug. 24, 2009), www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf
/Articles/522A39903AFD6CFB8525761D004F113B.
322. See, e.g., The G20 and Tax: Haven Hypocrisy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 28, 2009, at 86,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/13382279; see also JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 6
(2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf.
323. See Jeff Bater, FinCEN’s Due Diligence Proposal Criticized During Treasury
Hearing, 7 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. (BNA), Aug. 10, 2012, at 631. “Know your
customer” rules have been the backbone of anti-money-laundering efforts for years. See,
e.g., Ramasastry, supra note 40, at 342–45.
324. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA
N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in
Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1478.html; see also S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SENATE, U.S.
VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGS, AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HSBC CASE
HISTORY 2–4 (2012).
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2. General Deterrence
While from a relative culpability standpoint the offshore bank prosecutions are
suspect, it was clearly more practical for the U.S. government to go after a few
banks and bankers than the tens of thousands of depositors. The government indicts
less than 3000 defendants for tax crimes per year,325 and it must therefore choose
wisely the targets it will pursue. As part of its Deferred Prosecution Agreement
with UBS, UBS agreed to provide bank records on some of its customers.326 The
government opened a parallel John Doe summons proceeding in an attempt to
obtain bank account information from a broader population of depositors.327 It also
indicted a few of the depositors.328 In conjunction with these efforts, the
government offered a series of offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives.329 Thus,
depositors were left with the decision of whether to come forward and disclose
their account information and pay stiff civil penalties or risk criminal
prosecution.330 This carrot-and-stick strategy encouraged thousands of U.S.
taxpayers to come forward under the offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives and
garnered the government more than $4 billion in taxes and penalties.331 Therefore,
while the decision to pursue UBS criminally can be attacked from a theoretical
point of view, it is difficult to argue with the strategic choice the government made.
Hence, like the tax shelter prosecution policy, the government’s tax haven
strategy has been, and it appears that it will continue to be, quite successful. The
prosecution policy, along with diplomatic initiatives by the United States and other
governments, has fundamentally changed the world of offshore banking, at least
European offshore banking.332 An amendment to the U.S.–Switzerland Tax Treaty
would broaden the information the Swiss will share in tax cases.333 Numerous other

325. See supra note 229.
326. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, United States v. UBS AG (No. 09-60033-CRCohn) (S.D. Fla. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/UBS_Signed_Deferred
_Prosecution_Agreement.pdf.
327. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Asks Court to Serve IRS
Summons for UBS Swiss Bank Account Records (June 30, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-tax-579.html.
328. See Shotter, supra note 163.
329. Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (June 26, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International
-Taxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and
-Answers; 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Frequently Asked Questions and
Answers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International
-Businesses/2011-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-Frequently-Asked-Questions
-and-Answers (last updated July 19, 2013); Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Voluntary-Disclosure:
-Questions-and-Answers.
330. See Zehnle & Clarke, supra note 18.
331. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5, supra note 270.
332. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, International Tax Enforcement Continues to Rise, 64 TAX
NOTES INT’L 653 (2011).
333. See Lauren Gardner & Daniel Pruzin, Geithner Signs Protocol to U.S.-Swiss Treaty
to Provide Greater Tax Information Exchange, INT’L TAX MONITOR, (BNA), Sept. 24, 2009.

552

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:511

tax information exchange treaties have been signed,334 and Liechtenstein, which
was once known as the “the most dangerous tax haven in Europe,” 335 has begun to
ease its bank secrecy rules.336 Thus, from a deterrence perspective, the strategy
appears to have been at least somewhat successful. That being said, despite the
number of participants in the offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives, many more
taxpayers have chosen not to come forward.337 Moreover, even with the increased
cooperation of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, offshore banks in other jurisdictions
have rushed to fill the void, and it is therefore unclear whether tax haven abuse
generally has been reduced.338 Also, it is debatable whether these positive
developments necessarily flowed from the prosecution policy. Indeed, many
countries, including Britain and Germany, were able to secure similar benefits
without resorting to indictments of Swiss bankers.339
3. Compensating the Victim: The Effect of Tax Haven Abuse on the
Developing World
Pursuing UBS and other banks and bankers criminally, while allowing U.S.
taxpayers to resolve their cases civilly, has brought in more than $4.4 billion dollars
into the U.S. Treasury.340 These recoveries help to ameliorate the impact of tax
haven abuses on the U.S. Treasury. Thus, the government can reasonably assert
that, like the tax shelter initiatives, the victim—the U.S. taxpayer—has been
compensated, at least to a certain degree. In many respects this position is correct.
However, the amount recovered is a small fraction of the estimated $100 billion in
tax revenues that is lost annually due to offshore tax abuses.341 More significantly,
limiting the “victim” to the U.S. taxpayer is misleading and ignores the true victim
of tax haven abuse.
The most profound impact of tax havens and bank secrecy is on the citizens in
countries of the developing world whose leaders have used haven banks to steal

334. See, e.g., Alison Bennett, United States, Monaco Sign Agreement to Allow for
Exchange of Tax Information, 172 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Sept. 10, 2009 at I-6; Rick
Mitchell, Island of Jersey, United Kingdom Sign Tax Information Exchange Agreement, 46
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Mar. 13, 2009, at I-3.
335. 2 DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 4, at Liech. 1.
336. See, e.g., Haig Simonian, Liechtenstein Eases Bank Secrecy Rules, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
12, 2009, 6:24 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b85d298a-0ed9-11de-ba10-0000779
fd2ac.html#axzz22iMLu17a.
337. See, e.g., Laura Saunders, Tax-Cheat Showdown: Fess Up or Stay Quiet?, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 9, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125020653689430645.html.
338. See, e.g., William Brittain-Catlin, This Is Not the End for Tax Havens, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 27, 2010, 8:02 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/sep/27/not-end
-for-tax-havens.
339. See, e.g., Rick Mitchell, France, Switzerland Sign Tax Treaty Rider Aimed at Ending
Banking Secrecy, 165 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Aug. 28, 2009, at I-1; Daniel Pruzin, Germany,
Liechtenstein Approve TIEA Incorporating OECD Exchange Standards, 169 DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA)., Sept. 3, 2009, at I-1; Daniel Pruzin, Switzerland and Austria Conclude Accord on Tax
Information Exchange, 134 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), July 16, 2009, at I-3.
340. I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5, supra note 270.
341. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 112, at 1–2.
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their countries’ wealth. Unlike the use of offshore tax evasion in the developed
world, where citizens hide assets and income offshore to avoid paying taxes, in the
case of the developing world, it is the leaders themselves that use bank secrecy
jurisdictions to hide assets. In some instances, minor kleptocrats accumulate tidy
fortunes offshore to ensure a comfortable retirement. Other leaders, however, have
engaged in the systematic plunder of their own countries, accumulating massive
amounts of wealth in haven countries, leaving their countries and citizens
impoverished. Ndiva Kofele-Kale has referred to this practice as indigenous
spoliation,342 which he defines as an “illegal act of depredation committed for
private ends by constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private
individuals.”343 As Professor Kofele-Kale notes, the scope of this devastation goes
beyond mere embezzlement and corruption.344 While corrupt political leaders have
for millennia taken the wealth from their people, the scope and effect of this new
form of so-called “grand corruption” is fundamentally different.345
First, the ability in recent years to move money quickly and efficiently out of the
country, and then to hide it in a haven jurisdiction, means that the stolen wealth will
more likely be put offshore, rather than invested in the leader’s country.346 Thus,
the massive accumulation of assets abroad has the effect of draining resources that
might otherwise have been used in domestic investment.347 If more of those funds
stayed in-country, those funds could finance large development budgets.348 The
international development organization Christian Aid has estimated that if funds
deposited in tax haven countries were instead retained in the countries and spent on
areas such as health and education, the lives of poor people in the developing world
would be transformed.349 For example, if the same proportion of tax revenues were
spent on healthcare in these countries as has been diverted to tax havens since

342. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of
Indigenous Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 56 (1995).
343. Id. (emphasis in original). He has also referred to this conduct as “patrimonicide,”
which he describes as follows:
[“Patrimonicide”] comes from combining the Latin words “patrimonium,”
meaning “[t]he estate or property belonging by ancient right to an institution,
corporation, or class; especially the ancient estate or endowment of a church or
religious body,” and “cide,” meaning killing. This term is fitting because
indigenous spoliation is the destruction of the sum total of a state’s endowment,
the laying waste of the wealth and resources belonging by right to her citizens,
and the denial of their heritage.
Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
344. See id. at 56–59.
345. Id. at 58.
346. See id. at 58–59.
347. Investigation of Philippine Investments in the United States, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Asian and Pac. Affairs of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong. 263
(1987) (statement of Rep. Stephen Solarz, Chairman, Subcomm. on Asian and Pac. Affairs).
348. Angel Gurría, Improve Tax Fairness and Help the Developing World, ORG. FOR
ECON.
CO-OPERATION
&
DEV.
(Apr.
24,
2009),
http://www.oecd.org
/development/improvetaxfairnessandhelpthedevelopingworld.htm.
349. See CHRISTIAN AID, supra note 4, at 2.
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2000, then the lives of 350,000 children under the age of five would be saved every
year.350
Second, the sheer magnitude of the theft is startling.351 Every year, billions of
dollars are transferred to havens from the developing world.352 The think tank
Global Financial Integrity estimates that in 2006, between $858.6 billion and $1.06
trillion left developing countries in illicit financial outflows.353 The amounts stolen
have been described as going “beyond shame and almost beyond imagination.”354
Others have wondered whether the amassing of public wealth has risen “to a point
of madness or some form of obsessive or compulsive psychiatric disorder.”355 Even
the lowest estimate suggests that the illegal capital outflow exceeds the net legal
inflow. The illegal outflow corresponds roughly to ten times the development
assistance given to developing countries.356 The government of Norway, in its
comprehensive study of tax havens, noted:
Potentially the most serious consequences of tax havens are that they
can contribute to weakening the quality of institutions and the political
system in developing countries. This is because tax havens encourage
the self-interest that politicians and bureaucrats in such countries have
in weakening these institutions. The lack of effective enforcement
organisations mean that politicians can to a greater extent exploit the
opportunities which tax havens offer for concealing proceeds from
economic crime and rent-seeking. These proceeds can be derived from
corruption and other illegal activities, or be income which politicians
have dishonestly obtained from development assistance, natural
resources and the public purse. By making it easier to conceal the
proceeds of economic crime, tax havens create political incentives to
demolish rather than build up institutions, and to weaken rather than
strengthen democratic governance processes.357
Finally, the hallmark of contemporary indigenous spoliation is the social and
economic devastation that follows when capital of this magnitude is allowed to
leave a capital-poor developing country.358 As these funds are put offshore, their

350.
351.
352.
353.

Id.
Kofele-Kale, supra note 342, at 59.
Id.
DEV KAR & DEVON CARTWRIGHT-SMITH, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRITY: A
PROGRAM OF THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 2002–2006, at 22 (2008), available at http://www.gfip.org/storage
/gfip/economist%20-%20final%20version%201-2-09.pdf.
354. DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK: THE FULL STORY OF THE WORLD CREDIT CRISIS
60 (1984).
355. Sola Odunfa, African View: Insane with Greed, BBC NEWS (October 14, 2009,
14:32 UK), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8302729.stm (quoting Faroda Waziri, Exec.
Chairman of Nigeria’s Econ. and Fin. Crimes Comm’n).
356. GOV. COMM’N ON CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM POOR COUNTRIES, TAX HAVENS AND
DEVELOPMENT 13 (2009) [hereinafter NORWAY REPORT], available at http://www
.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/tax_report.pdf.
357. Id.
358. Kofele-Kale, supra note 342, at 59.
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countries are required to borrow from foreign lenders, adding to the already
crushing debt of these countries. The price of these outflows is “billions of dollarsworth of unsurfaced roads, unpurified water and untreated illnesses.”359 Christian
Aid has predicted that between 2000 and 2015, 5.6 million young children in the
developing world will die due to this financial devastation.360 Kofele-Kale points
out that the impact on the developing world extends beyond those countries’
borders in the form of refugees, regional conflicts, and the diversion of foreign aid
to private coffers.361 Perhaps the greatest irony is that developed countries and
private charities are subsidizing tax havens by allowing international aid to be
siphoned off and diverted to tax haven accounts for the benefit of corrupt
kleptocrats.
Thus, while the image most connected with tax havens is of sleek yachts in
Cayman harbors, the impact of haven jurisdictions falls upon the poorest of the
world’s poor. While the U.S. government should not be faulted for making sure
U.S. taxpayers are repaid the losses caused by tax havens, compensation of the
victim cannot stop there. Any solution that developed countries like the United
States can obtain through their superior bargaining power must take into account
the effect tax havens have on developing countries. The U.S. government is in the
process of establishing a network of information exchange agreements
administered through the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).362 The
United States is negotiating intergovernmental agreements with countries like
Japan, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Mexico.363 The information obtained
via FATCA will be much more timely and robust than the information that can be
obtained through treaty requests.

359. African Debt: Borrowed Time, ECONOMIST, May 22, 1993, at 66.
360. See CHRISTIAN AID, supra note 4, at 1.
361. Kofele-Kale, supra note 342, at 62–66.
362. The FATCA provisions were enacted on March 18, 2010, under Title V of the HIRE
Act. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71, 97
(codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474).
363. See Agreement Between the Department of the Treasury of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of the United Mexican States to
Improve International Tax Compliance Including with Respect to FATCA, U.S.-Mex., Nov.
19, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents
/FATCA-Agreement-Mexico-11-19-2012.pdf; Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark to Improve
International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, U.S.-Den., Nov. 15, 2012,
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA
-Agreement-Denmark-11-19-2012.pdf; Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, U.S.-U.K.N.Ir., Sept. 12, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy
/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-UK-9-12-2012.pdf; Joint Statement from the United
States and Japan Regarding a Framework for Intergovernmental Cooperation to Facilitate the
Implementation of FACTA and Improve International Tax Compliance, U.S.-Japan, June 21,
2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents
/FATCA-Joint-Statement-US-Japan-06-21-2012.pdf.
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Including less developed countries in this information exchange would help to
reduce the impact of tax havens on these countries. Of course, it would be naïve to
believe that mere information exchange would cure the scourge that tax havens
impose on the developing world. Indeed, the very nature of indigenous spoliation is
that those in power, who would receive the exchanged information, are those who
are hiding money offshore. Nevertheless, given the interrelated nature of the
banking system and the dangers of not obtaining and supplying this information,
excluding the developing world from the network of information exchange is not a
viable option.364 It has been noted that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants.”365 Shining sunlight on tax haven abuses will help cleanse the
wounds in the developed and the developing world.
4. Preserving the Integrity of the Tax System
The criminal cases against Swiss bankers satisfied, at least to a certain extent,
the Tax Division’s stated goal of preserving the integrity of the civil tax system.
Offshore banks are less likely to assist U.S. taxpayers in hiding their money, and
thousands of bank accounts that had been “undeclared” for years have now been
reported to the IRS. New tax and information exchange treaties have been
negotiated between many nations. Perhaps more significantly, the debate around
tax havens has changed.366 Havens are no longer an accepted practice, and
governments and policy makers are actively seeking new ways to limit the impact
of havens. And this, as Martha Stewart would say, is a good thing. But more must
be done. The IRS must continue in its robust civil enforcement of international tax
avoidance and transfer pricing cases. The government cannot stop with the Swiss
banks and declare victory. There remains an estimated $21–32 trillion secreted in
tax haven countries.367 More importantly, the United States and other developed
countries cannot posture about the evils of bank secrecy and tax haven abuses,
while tolerating similar practices within their own borders. As discussed above,
U.S. banks are not required to, and do not, issue tax reporting forms with respect to
accounts held by nonresident aliens, and the U.S. government does not provide
bank deposit information to any of its treaty partners.368 Hypocrisy does little to
boost the integrity of the tax system.369

364. The HSBC case is an excellent example of the perils of ignoring the activities of
offshore banks to the U.S. banking system. HSBC Group members facilitated money
laundering and terrorism, and provided drug lords, terrorists, and other criminals access to
the U.S. banking system. See HSBC Press Release, supra note 268.
365. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62
(Richard M. Abrams ed., Harper & Row 1967) (1914).
366. See, e.g., Davos: The Tide Is Turning Against Tax Havens, BANKING BUS. REV.,
Feb. 16, 2009.
367. John D. McKinnon, Tax Justice Network: Wealth Held in Tax Havens Skyrockets,
WALL ST. J. WASH. WIRE BLOG (July 22, 2012, 5:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire
/2012/07/22/tax-justice-network-wealth-held-in-tax-havens-skyrockets/.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 283–89.
369. See David S. Miller, How U.S. Tax Law Encourages Investment Through Tax
Havens, 131 TAX NOTES 167 (2011).
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Moreover, the stakes are higher than just the integrity of the U.S. tax system. As
the facts of the HSBC investigation demonstrate, there are other dangers of bank
secrecy.370 Tax havens are used not only to evade income taxes and hide assets.
Bank secrecy allows illegal, as well as legal, income to be hidden, and financial
anonymity allows drug dealers, organized crime, and terrorism financing to remain
undetected. In this regard, the Norway Report stated:
[T]he damaging structures in tax havens not only influence tax
revenues in other states. These structures are also suitable for
conducting and concealing a great many forms of criminal activity in
which it is important to hide the identity of those involved, where the
crimes are being committed and what they involve. This includes such
activities as the illegal sale of valuable goods, art, weapons and
narcotics, human trafficking, terrorism, corruption, theft, fraud and
other serious economic crimes.371
Tax havens also contributed to the devastating financial crisis of recent years.372
Thus, any prosecution policy should focus on obtaining information to combat less
morally ambiguous crimes—money laundering, terrorism financing, and drug
trafficking.
5. Summary
On balance, prosecuting offshore banks and bankers was the right choice. Like
the tax shelter prosecutions, the decision to prosecute the professionals was more
effective than prosecuting the few depositors that the Department of Justice’s
resources would permit. While the decision to go after the banks was perhaps
suspect from a theoretical perspective, its deterrent effect cannot be disputed. The
prosecutorial stick, combined with greater informational exchange and voluntary
disclosure initiatives, has brought unprecedented cooperation with respect to
offshore bank accounts. Yet, more must be done. The current prosecution policy has
made only a small dent in tax haven abuses, and it appears to have done nothing to
ameliorate the impact of havens on the developing world. The tax- shelter war may
indeed be over, and if it is, the government certainly won.373 However, the recent
prosecutions are not the end of the tax-haven war. At best, we can hope that these
prosecutions represent the “end of the beginning.”374

370. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 112.
371. NORWAY REPORT, supra note 356, at 20.
372. See, e.g., Rachel Keeler, Tax Havens and the Financial Crisis: From Offshore Havens to
Financial Centers, Banking Secrecy Faces Scrutiny, DOLLARS & SENSE, May–June 2009, at 21,
available at http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2009/0509keeler.html.
373. See Fleischer, supra note 107.
374. The full quote from a wartime speech by Winston Churchill is: “Now this is not the
end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE END OF THE BEGINNING 266 (1943), available at
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/1941-1945
-war-leader/987-the-end-of-the-beginning.
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V. CONCLUSION
The decision to bring a criminal prosecution is one of the most significant
decisions a government can make. In deciding to employ its limited prosecutorial
resources against any person, the government must ensure that it is charging only
clear violations of the law and that prosecution goals will be fulfilled by the
indictment. Merely because the government can successfully bring a criminal
prosecution does not necessarily mean that it should. In making decisions whether to
prosecute or not to prosecute, a determination of guilt by the defendant is not
sufficient. Only those cases that satisfy all of the stated goals should be advanced.
Going forward, future investigations and prosecutions should focus more
explicitly on the purposes for which criminal tax prosecutions are brought: to punish
wrongdoers (the correct ones), to promote the integrity of the tax system (such as it
is), and to redress the wrongs inflicted on the victims (all of them). While the tax
shelter prosecutions satisfied each of these, the tax haven prosecutions did not; this
was not because the offshore bankers were innocent, but because the prosecutions
left so many problems unaddressed. Most banks, including U.S. banks, still do not
provide information about their depositors to other governments. Trillions of dollars
remain squirreled away offshore, with much of that money coming from the
countries least able to deal with the outflow of cash. Accordingly, despite the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation’s belief that there is “newfound
international determination to contest tax evasion facilitated by a tax haven bank,”375
it does not appear that there is unanimity that bank transparency is an attainable, or
even a desirable, goal. Until such unanimity can be reached, criminal prosecutions of
offshore banks will be suspect.
That being said, significant progress has been made. The recent prosecutions of
professionals have introduced—and proven—a powerful new tool for the
government. Prosecuting professionals magnifies the deterrent effect of these
prosecutions; shutting down the service providers is more effectual than prosecuting
the clients. Accordingly, where professionals of any kind facilitate criminal activity,
focusing on the enablers should be a viable, if not the primary, target.

375. SENATE REPORT, supra note 112, at 2.

